Chapter 20

The associates

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The associates

Introduction

  1. The Terms of Reference direct the Commission to inquire into whether each associate of Crown Melbourne is unsuitable to be associated with its casino business. If an associate is found to be unsuitable, the Terms of Reference require the Commission to identify what action would be required for the associate to become suitable.
  2. The Casino Control Act contains a definition of ‘associate’.1 It is a clumsy definition and, in some respects, difficult to apply. In substance, an associate:
    • is a person who:
      • holds a share in the capital of the casino business or has an entitlement to receive any income derived by the casino business; or
      • has the power, whether exercisable alone or in association with others, (i) to participate in any directorial, managerial or executive decision; or (ii) to elect or appoint any person to be a director, manager or to some other executive position,

      and by virtue of that fact is able to exercise a significant influence over the casino operations

    • is a director, manager, other executive or company secretary.
  3. Two obvious issues arise from the definition. One is how it should apply where the relevant power is exercised indirectly—for example, through a holding company of the casino licensee. The second is that it is difficult to determine what is meant by a ‘managerial’ decision. Various officers within a corporation make decisions. Some are significant, some are only marginal and some sit somewhere in between. It is not clear whether participation in a ‘managerial’ decision is intended to cover every company decision by persons other than ordinary employees. If it is, a vast number of personnel have the relevant power.
  4. Ms Bergin, SC was critical of the equivalent definition—of close associate—in section 5 of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW). She described the definition as ‘overly technical and not fit for purpose’. She said that several of the terms embedded in the definition were undefined and nebulous.2
  5. Moving on, the test for the suitability of an associate is the same test as applies to determine the suitability of a casino operator. The test is described in Chapter 18. In brief, to satisfy the test the person must be of good character and financially stable.
  6. There are two groups of associates of Crown Melbourne:
    • Crown Resorts, which is an associate because of its power to control the Crown Melbourne board
    • the current directors and senior executives of Crown Melbourne, who are associates because of the position they hold and power they exercise.
  7. This chapter will consider the suitability of the current directors and a number of the senior executives. For the most part, they have recently become associates and it is appropriate that their suitability be considered.
  8. There are, however, other executives whose suitability has not been examined. The reason is that nothing in the voluminous material that the Commission has examined suggests these executives may not be suitable associates. Therefore, they were not called to give evidence.
  9. There is a third group that may qualify as an associate. This is the CPH group (controlled by Mr James Packer), which may be an associate because one company in the group, CPH Crown Holdings Pty Limited, in which other members of the group hold an interest, is a substantial shareholder in Crown Resorts (approximately 37 per cent). Its shareholding would give it power to control Crown Melbourne.3
  10. The reason there is uncertainty as to whether the CPH group qualifies as an associate of Crown Melbourne is because of undertakings recently given by the CPH group to ILGA. The undertakings are not to enter into any information-sharing arrangement with Crown Resorts, not to initiate discussions with Crown Resorts about its business or operations, not to appoint nominees to the Crown Resorts board and not to seek amendments to Crown Resorts’ constitution.4
  11. One undertaking—not to appoint nominees—runs for a fixed period. The other undertakings can be withdrawn at any time. The CPH group is unlikely to be an associate while the undertakings are in place.
  12. This chapter will proceed on the assumption that the CPH group is, or is likely to be, an associate, although it is acknowledged that this may not be the true position.5

Crown Resorts

  1. The Bergin Inquiry found that Crown Resorts was not a suitable person to be a close associate of Crown Sydney.6 In brief, Ms Bergin, SC found:
    • Between 2014 and 2019, Crown Resorts enabled and facilitated money laundering through the bank accounts of Southbank and Riverbank, and that this situation went unchecked and unchanged despite warnings from its bankers.7
    • Between 2014 and 2016, Crown Resorts disregarded the welfare of its China-based staff, putting them at risk of detention by pursuing an aggressive sales policy and failing to escalate risks through the appropriate corporate risk management structures.8
    • Between 2012 and 2020, Crown Resorts entered into and/or continued commercial relationships with junket operators who had links to triads and other organised crime groups. Further, it maintained those relationships after becoming aware of persistent allegations of such connections in national and international media reports and its own due diligence reports.9
  2. In addition to those findings, this Commission has uncovered more misconduct on the part of Crown Melbourne when it was under the control of Crown Resorts. For the most part, Crown Resorts’ executives were closely involved in that wrongdoing, and they often instigated it.10
  3. It is clear that Crown Resorts is not a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

The CPH group

  1. Assuming the CPH group is an associate of Crown Melbourne, which CPH contends it is not, the group’s close involvement in Crown Resorts’ misconduct that was identified by the Bergin Inquiry makes it (strictly speaking, every member of the corporate group, together with Mr Packer) unsuitable to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.
  2. One recommendation made by this Commission will, if implemented, bring any potential future association to an end. The recommendation is that (subject to certain exceptions) no person, including the CPH group, can hold a relevant interest in 5 per cent or more of the capital of Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne. The effect of this recommendation would apply to the CPH group from September 2024.11
  3. Once the CPH group shareholding in Crown Resorts falls below 5 per cent, the group will not be an associate of Crown Melbourne even upon the expiry of its undertakings to ILGA.

Office holders

  1. When this Commission commenced its inquiries, the associates of Crown Melbourne included Ms Helen Coonan, the Executive Chairman of Crown Resorts and Mr Xavier Walsh, a director and CEO of Crown Melbourne.
  2. The Commission has been informed that neither Ms Coonan nor Mr Walsh will hold office by the time the Commission hands down its Report.12 Accordingly, it is not appropriate for the Commission to consider the position of these officers.
  3. On 27 August 2021, the Commission was informed that Dr Zygmunt (Ziggy) Switkowski, AO will succeed Ms Coonan as Chairman effective immediately. Dr Switkowski’s appointment is subject to probity and regulatory approvals.13
  4. Given the recency of his appointment and the fact that it remains subject to approvals, the Commission has not considered the suitability of Dr Switkowski as an associate.
  5. The balance of this section examines the suitability of:
    • Ms Antonia Korsanos, a director of both Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne since 2018
    • Ms Jane Halton, a director of Crown Resorts since 2018
    • Mr Nigel Morrison, a director of both Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne appointed this year
    • Mr Bruce Carter, a director of Crown Resorts also appointed this year
    • Mr Alan McGregor, the CFO of Crown Resorts
    • Mr Stephen McCann, the CEO of Crown Melbourne and Crown Resorts
    • Mr Steven Blackburn, the Group Chief Compliance and Financial Crime Officer at Crown Resorts.

Antonia Korsanos

  1. Ms Korsanos was appointed a non-executive director of Crown Resorts on 23 May 2018. She was appointed a non-executive director of Crown Melbourne on 5 September 2018 and the Chair of the Crown Melbourne board on 17 February 2021. She is also a member of five Crown Resorts committees, including its Responsible Gaming Committee and RMC.14
  2. Ms Korsanos has recently been appointed Chair of Crown Sydney Gaming Pty Ltd.15
  3. Before joining Crown, Ms Korsanos was an executive at Aristocrat Leisure Limited, first as its CFO and then as its company secretary. Prior to that, Ms Korsanos held various senior finance roles at major public companies.16
  4. Because of her background, Ms Korsanos has considerable experience in the gaming sector.
  5. Ms Korsanos is clearly a person of good character. This was recognised by the Bergin Inquiry. The Bergin Report records:

    The more recently appointed independent directors, Ms Halton and Ms Korsanos, together form a core of the changing character of the company upon which the [ILGA] would be justified in relying for honest, open and fair dealing in the future.17

  6. During her tenure on the Crown Resorts board, Ms Korsanos became aware of the many cultural deficiencies at Crown. She appreciates that Crown’s culture must change and that to effect change will take time and require commitment.18
  7. Ms Korsanos said:

    I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t believe that we could change Crown. I think me, like everybody in the business, has had a choice that we could make. I think the way I think means I didn’t see this as a choice, it was a duty I had. I signed up as a director, fell into … well, I got a great understanding out of the Bergin Inquiry and unfortunately more surprises out of this one, but I like to look … I am a glass half-full person and I like to look at every problem from the perspective of how do you solve it. And back in February I could have made a choice to move on, but I didn’t, because I had signed up. I held myself accountable for what I now understood and I could see that I could be part of the solution.

    …

    But I truly believe that we are on the right path and in my experience you start with your strategies and you start to act as quickly as you can with changes like those that we are engaging in through the reform agenda. And then you follow through with your cultural program, right. And the cultural program really is about establishing the baseline. I think with the team we have today it is about reinforcing, well, revisiting our values …

    We’ve done that across a number of our functions but there is still more to be done. But I think we have definitely … the change I’ve seen here versus how I saw cultural change in my prior experience, this change has been a lot faster. I don’t think we can dismiss the signalling of change from the top down, what the signalling of that change, and also the experience of the NSW Inquiry and the Royal Commission, I don’t think we can dismiss the effect that that has had in terms of speeding up the effort and the outcomes.

    There is still a lot to do, there is still a lot to do and what is to be done is more about the longevity of maintaining and sustaining that change and making sure we have the right accountabilities in the business and people understand and have a line of sight of what their job means in the context of doing the right thing in the context of respect, working together and passion, or whatever the values are when we define what is relevant going forward.

    I will finish with where I started; I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t believe it could be achieved. I don’t believe in failure. I do believe I can support this change. I’ve seen it before. I think we have a group of people who are, despite the fatigue, are completely committed and motivated to do this.19

  8. It is clear that Ms Korsanos has a strong commitment to Crown’s reformation. She understands that changes must be made from the top down and that Crown’s reformation is a work in progress.
  9. Ms Korsanos is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne. She has however, indicated her intention to resign as a director.20

Jane Halton

  1. Ms Halton was appointed a non-executive director of Crown Resorts on 23 May 2018. She is a member of several Crown Resorts committees, including its RMC and Audit and Corporate Governance Committee. She joined the Crown Resorts board at the same time as Ms Korsanos.21
  2. Following the departure of Mr Walsh, Ms Halton was appointed as a director of Crown Melbourne and will act as interim Chairman of Crown Resorts until Dr Switkowski receives the necessary regulatory and probity approvals.22
  3. Ms Halton is a highly experienced and qualified director. Before joining the business community, Ms Halton held senior roles in the Australian Public Service, including Secretary of the Department of Finance and Secretary of the Department of Health.23
  4. Currently Ms Halton is also a director of ANZ Banking Group Limited, law firm Clayton Utz, the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington, among others. Further, she is an Adjunct Professor at both the University of Sydney and the University of Canberra and a council member of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.24
  5. Ms Halton’s good character was recognised in the Bergin Report. It records:

    The more recently appointed independent directors, Ms Halton and Ms Korsanos, together form a core of the changing character of the company upon which the [ILGA] would be justified in relying for honest, open and fair dealing in the future.25

  6. Ms Halton is alive to the need for reform at Crown. She appreciates that cultural reform is a very important part of Crown’s ongoing remediation plan and has taken steps to ensure the reform program is proceeding.
  7. Recently Ms Halton met the partner at Deloitte leading Deloitte’s review of Crown’s culture.26 Ms Halton gave this account of their meeting:

    So we went through a series of observations. She talked about the fact that there had been focus groups and what she was detecting. I asked a series of questions because of my particular interest about whether, for example, the changed tone and the tone from the top and the messaging to staff in her experience or focus group work had been heard, what the reaction if they are being heard is. We talked about the breadth and the variety of different components of the business.

    …

    She said she had been having it reflected back to her, and in fact I took from that meeting a level of comfort that notwithstanding the relatively short period since we exited the vast number of directors and a series of senior management, that those messages, and I was very … I mean, I had been very keen for the Executive Chairman to send regular messaging to staff, all staff, and I was trying … she was telling me that those messages were being looked at and were being heard. So they are not just read but the message was being absorbed.27

  8. Ms Halton is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Nigel Morrison

  1. Mr Morrison is a new appointee to the boards of Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne, having taken the position on 28 January 2021.28 On 27 August 2021, the Commission was advised that Mr Morrison was appointed as Chairman of Crown Melbourne.29
  2. Although a recent appointment, Mr Morrison has a long history with Crown. He played a key role coordinating the consortium that bid for the casino licence and he worked in various executive finance roles until 2000.30
  3. Mr Morrison has other experience in the casino industry. For example, he was the Managing Director and CEO of SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited (SkyCity) between 2008 and 2016 and the CFO of the Galaxy Entertainment Group between 2007 and 2008 (both SkyCity and Galaxy own and operate casinos).31
  4. More broadly, Mr Morrison spent 13 years at Ernst & Young, ultimately as a partner in its corporate advisory practice.32
  5. Mr Morrison informed the Commission that when he joined SkyCity in 2008, ‘there were in many ways, some similar challenges to those that face Crown’. He said that there had been no permanent CEO for over a year, the culture was not good, there were accusations of loansharking, and relations with regulators and governments were strained. Mr Morrison said he was able to successfully transform SkyCity in these circumstances.33
  6. Mr Morrison recognises that the challenges facing Crown are ‘seriously substantial’.34 He identified a number of key challenges: rebuilding relationships and trust with regulators and governments; rebuilding the community’s view of Crown and regaining public confidence; managing Crown’s banking and rating agency relationships and funding, including as the Commission’s findings and those of other investigations emerge; repositioning Crown’s RSG to best practice; developing and implementing a new business plan to reflect changes to Crown’s business model following the Bergin Inquiry and the Commission; and retaining quality staff and management, attracting high-quality new employees and maintaining staff morale and engagement.35
  7. Mr Morrison stressed that he considered it ‘absolutely appropriate and fundamental to proper governance of any company’ that its directors be independent and not constrained by loyalties that might unduly prejudice their judgement.36 He further emphasised the importance of an honest, open, frank and constructive relationship with the regulator.37
  8. Mr Morrison did say that in the past he had dealings with Mr Kerry Packer, Mr James Packer and CPH.38
  9. This is unsurprising given Mr Morrison’s involvement in the casino sector. None of his dealings with Mr Kerry Packer, Mr James Packer or CPH affect Mr Morrison’s suitability to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.
  10. Mr Morrison is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Bruce Carter

  1. Mr Carter was invited to join the Crown Resorts board on 12 April 2021.39 The regulator approved the appointment on 16 June 2021 and the appointment was confirmed.40
  2. Following the departure of Mr Walsh, Mr Carter was appointed as an additional director of Crown Melbourne.41
  3. Mr Carter was a partner at Ernst & Young and the Managing Partner at Ferrier Hodgson. In those positions he acquired extensive knowledge of corporate insolvency, restructuring and the ‘turnaround’ of companies.42
  4. Since 2012, Mr Carter’s primary role has been as a non-executive company director. He was a non-executive director of SkyCity for 11 years until his appointment to the Crown Resorts board.43
  5. It is clear from Mr Carter’s experience that he has a sound understanding of the risks currently facing Crown and the community expectations of that organisation. He also understands what needs to be done to repair the situation.44
  6. Mr Carter is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Alan McGregor

  1. Mr McGregor has been at Crown for 16 years. He was the CFO of several Crown companies, including Crown Melbourne. He has been the CFO of Crown Resorts for 12 months.45
  2. Prior to joining Crown, Mr McGregor worked at SkyCity for seven years in various finance roles.46
  3. Mr McGregor had knowledge of, and some involvement in, the Bonus Jackpots tax issue.47
  4. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Mr McGregor did not suggest to the Crown Melbourne board or to its Risk Management or Compliance Committees that the tax issue be properly investigated or that it be raised with the regulator. This was a failing on his part.
  5. Perhaps the failing can be explained by Mr McGregor’s belief that the then CEO and Managing Director of Crown Resorts, Mr Ken Barton, would appropriately deal with the issue.48
  6. Mr McGregor is an experienced senior executive at Crown. His conduct plays a part in setting the culture of the organisation. His failure to bring the Bonus Jackpot tax issue to the attention of others (for example, the board or the regulator) does raise questions about his judgement.
  7. However, bad judgement does not mean that Mr McGregor is an unsuitable associate.
  8. Mr McGregor is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Stephen McCann

  1. Mr McCann was appointed CEO of Crown Resorts effective 1 June 2021. On 20 August 2021 he was appointed CEO of Crown Melbourne.49
  2. Mr McCann has recently been appointed a director of Burswood Limited.50
  3. Mr McCann was appointed as CEO of Crown Resorts because of his general experience in the business world. He has worked in the banking and financial sectors and for Lendlease, a large multinational construction company. At Lendlease he was the Group Chief Executive and later, for a period of 12 years, he was the Managing Director.51
  4. Mr McCann is a competent leader well able to run a large and complex organisation. While at Lendlease he presided over significant changes, including improvements to safety, regulatory compliance and culture.52
  5. Mr McCann described cultural change as requiring a combination of ‘leadership from the top’, ‘setting a direction and a purpose and a vision that people can subscribe to, buy into, be motivated and energised by’, and ‘systems and processes that enable them to follow the leadership’.53
  6. Mr McCann recognises the need for cultural change at Crown Melbourne. He said:

    Crown’s culture needs to reflect an organisation which understands that it is not sustainable to generate revenue from vulnerable people and that it is the responsibility of all employees, not just responsible gaming staff, to be aware of the risks of gambling addiction and to be able to identify observable signs or concerning data and bring it to the appropriate person’s attention. In addition, Crown’s culture needs to encourage all staff to be willing to report any misgivings they may have about any behaviours or practices they observe without any fear of retribution and to be confident instead that their concerns will be addressed and people will be held directly accountable for their actions and rewarded for appropriate behaviour and quality outcomes.54

  7. Mr McCann also appreciates the importance of restoring public confidence in Crown. He acknowledged ‘[t]he long-term viability and sustainability of Crown requires both a social licence and a regulatory licence’, and that Crown must keep pace with an increased focus on responsible gambling and environmental and social responsibility.55
  8. It is clear that Mr McCann has carefully reflected on the challenges Crown faces, and the challenges he will face in his role. He recognises that Crown Melbourne’s employees are ‘looking for direction … [and] leadership’ and considers this his responsibility.56
  9. Mr McCann has no experience dealing with a regulator but has been educating himself about the regulator’s role. Recently he has been involved in discussions with the regulator, particularly about Crown Melbourne’s need to be open and transparent.57
  10. Mr McCann is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Steven Blackburn

  1. Mr Blackburn was appointed as Crown’s Chief Compliance and Financial Crime Officer on 24 February 2021.58
  2. Mr Blackburn has extensive experience in anti-financial crime programs in the banking sector. From 2018 to 2021 he was the Chief Financial Crime Risk Officer and Group Money Laundering Reporting Officer at NAB. From 2011 to 2018, he was the Chief Anti-Money Laundering Officer at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.59
  3. Through these roles he developed expertise in AML, CTF, sanctions and anti-bribery and corruption. He was responsible for designing, implementing, overseeing and monitoring anti-financial crime regimes, and for building and maintaining relationships with regulators and stakeholders—in NAB’s case with entities such as the AFP, AUSTRAC and Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group.60
  4. Prior to 2011 Mr Blackburn practised as a lawyer. He held various senior legal positions, including as Managing Counsel at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.61
  5. Following his appointment at Crown, Mr Blackburn’s role was extended to overseeing RSG. Although he has no prior experience with RSG, he has sought to educate himself in this area.62
  6. Mr Blackburn is a person of considerable skill, diligence and integrity. He describes himself as being a ‘passionate advocate for integrity functions’.63 Based on what he now knows, Mr Blackburn has accepted that Crown’s past culture was ‘as bad as [he’d] ever seen anywhere’ in his professional experience.64
  7. Nevertheless, he is optimistic that there has been a genuine and significant cultural shift at Crown.65
  8. Based on his assessment of Crown’s current level of ‘maturity’ with respect to financial crime and compliance, Mr Blackburn has developed an ambitious financial crime and compliance change program.66
  9. He has also devised a proposed series of enhancements to Crown’s RSG Program, though he emphasised that these were not comprehensive and would be further developed in due course.67
  10. The change program and the proposed enhancements were endorsed by the Crown Resorts board on 24 May 2021.68 They demonstrate Mr Blackburn’s genuine intention to bring about change at Crown.
  11. Mr Blackburn is a suitable person to be an associate of Crown Melbourne.

Conclusion

  1. The New South Wales Government has announced that its Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) will be amended to change the definition of close associate to address some of the ambiguities mentioned earlier.
  2. The deficiencies in the Casino Control Act should also be remedied, although not precisely along the lines proposed in New South Wales.69

Recommendation 32: Definition of associate

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended so that ‘associate’ means:

  • the holding company and each intermediate holding company of the casino operator (holding company to be defined as in the Corporations Act);
  • any person who has a relevant interest (as defined in the Corporations Act) in at least 5 per cent of the issued capital of the casino operator, or any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company;
  • any director or officer (as defined in the Corporations Act) of the casino operator, any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company; and
  • any individual or company certified by the regulator to be an associate.

Recommendation 33: Increase in shareholding

It is recommended that an associate cannot increase its relevant interest in the issued capital of the casino operator, or any of its intermediate holding companies or its ultimate holding company, without the written approval of the regulator.

Endnotes

1 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 4.

2 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 633 [93], 634 [97].

3 In addition to CPH Crown Holdings Pty Limited, as of March 2021, other members of the CPH group included CPH Gaming IVA Pty Limited, CPH Gaming IVB Pty Limited, CPH Gaming III Pty Limited, CPH Gaming II Pty Limited, CPH Gaming I Pty Ltd, Consolidated Press Holdings Pty Ltd, Conpress Holdings Pty Ltd, Bareage Pty Ltd and Consolidated Press Financial Services Pty Ltd.

4 Exhibit RC1411 Email chain between Guy Jalland, Murray Smith and Phillip Crawford, 15 March 2021.

5 Responsive submission CPH Parties, 2 August 2021, 5 [5].

6 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 566 [140].

7 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 543 [9].

8 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 543 [9].

9 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 543–4 [9], 545 [18].

10 See, eg, Chapters 10 and 12.

11 The CPH Parties submit that no shareholding cap is necessary or desirable: Responsive submission CPH Parties, 2 August 2021, Part C.

12 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 324 [1], 328 [2].

13 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

14 Exhibit RC0434 Statement of Antonia Korsanos, 27 April 2021, 1; Transcript of Antonia Korsanos, 7 July 2021, 3649.

15 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

16 Exhibit RC0434 Statement of Antonia Korsanos, 27 April 2021, 1.

17 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 467 [10].

18 Transcript of Antonia Korsanos, 7 July 2021, 3710.

19 Transcript of Antonia Korsanos, 7 July 2021, 3708–9.

20 Crown Resorts, 'Retirement of Director' (ASX Media Release, 16 September 2021).

21 Exhibit RC0427 Statement of Jane Halton, 28 April 2021, 1 [2]–[3].

22 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

23 Exhibit RC0427 Statement of Jane Halton, 28 April 2021, 1 [4].

24 Exhibit RC0427 Statement of Jane Halton, 28 April 2021, 1 [5].

25 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 467 [10].

26 See Chapter 5.

27 Transcript of Jane Halton, 7 July 2021, 3587–8.

28 Crown Resorts, ‘Appointment of Nigel Morrison as a Director’ (ASX Media Release, 28 January 2021).

29 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

30 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 1.

31 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 1–2.

32 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 3–4.

33 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 4.

34 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 8.

35 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 8.

36 Transcript of Nigel Morrison, 22 June 2021, 2268.

37 Transcript of Nigel Morrison, 22 June 2021, 2280–1.

38 Exhibit RC0223 Statement of Nigel Morrison, 15 June 2021, 2–3.

39 Exhibit RC0931 Statement of Bruce Carter, 12 June 2021, 1.

40 Exhibit RC1269 Letter from John Curran to Michelle Fielding, 16 June 2021.

41 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

42 Exhibit RC0931 Statement of Bruce Carter, 12 June 2021, 1, 4.

43 Exhibit RC0931 Statement of Bruce Carter, 12 June 2021, 2.

44 Exhibit RC0931 Statement of Bruce Carter, 12 June 2021, 3–4.

45 Exhibit RC0423 Statement of Alan McGregor, 16 April 2021, 1.

46 Exhibit RC0423 Statement of Alan McGregor, 16 April 2021, 1.

47 Exhibit RC0332 Email chain between Michelle Fielding and Nicole Wendt et al, 4 June 2018; Exhibit RC0824 Email chain between Peter Herring and Michelle Fielding et al, 5 June 2018. For further discussion of the Bonus Jackpots tax issue, see Chapter 12.

48 See the following minutes: Exhibit RC1294 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 18 February 2020; Exhibit RC1295 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 25 March 2020; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure hhhhhhh; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure kkkkkkk; Exhibit RC1296 Crown Resorts board diligent pack, 15 April 2020; Exhibit RC0437 Statement of Helen Coonan, 28 April 2021, Annexure a; Exhibit RC1297 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 9 September 2020; Exhibit RC0437 Statement of Helen Coonan, 28 April 2021, Annexure n; Exhibit RC1298 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 2 November 2020; Exhibit RC0437 Statement of Helen Coonan, 28 April 2021, Annexure f; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure vvvvvvv; Exhibit RC1299 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 15 January 2021; Exhibit RC1300 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 28 January 2021; Exhibit RC1301 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 9 February 2021; Exhibit RC1245 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 17 February 2021; Exhibit RC1302 Minutes of Crown Melbourne board meeting, 11 February 2020; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure yyyy; Exhibit RC1304 Minutes of Crown Melbourne board meeting, 11 August 2020; Exhibit R1306 Minutes of Crown Melbourne board meeting, 2 November 2020; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ccccc; Exhibit RC1327 Crown Resorts Responsible Gaming Committee diligent pack, 23 June 2020; Exhibit RC1328 Minutes of Crown Resorts Responsible Gaming Committee meeting, 11 August 2020; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure fffff; Exhibit RC1329 Minutes of Crown Resorts Responsible Gaming Committee meeting, 2 December 2020; Exhibit RC1344 Minutes of Crown Melbourne Compliance Committee meeting, 23 November 2020; Exhibit RC1345 Papers, Crown Melbourne Compliance meeting, 2 February 2021; Exhibit RC1346 Minutes of Crown Melbourne Compliance Committee meeting, 25 May 2021.

49 Crown Resorts, 'Crown Melbourne Management Changes' (ASX Media Release, 20 August 2021).

50 Exhibit RC1617 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 27 August 2021.

51 Exhibit RC0419 Statement of Stephen McCann, 15 June 2021, 2.

52 Exhibit RC0419 Statement of Stephen McCann, 15 June 2021, 4; Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 39–40 [C.37].

53 Transcript of Stephen McCann, 6 July 2021, 3488.

54 Exhibit RC0419 Statement of Stephen McCann, 15 June 2021, 9.

55 Transcript of Stephen McCann, 6 July 2021, 3510.

56 Transcript of Stephen McCann, 6 July 2021, 3489–90.

57 Transcript of Stephen McCann, 6 July 2021, 3451–6.

58 Exhibit RC0310 Supplementary Statement of Steven Blackburn, 28 April 2021, 2.

59 Exhibit RC0310 Supplementary Statement of Steven Blackburn, 28 April 2021, 1–2.

60 Exhibit RC0310 Supplementary Statement of Steven Blackburn, 28 April 2021, 2.

61 Exhibit RC0310 Supplementary Statement of Steven Blackburn, 28 April 2021, 2.

62 See, eg, Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3033.

63 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3036.

64 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 2962–3.

65 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 2933, 2963.

66 Exhibit RC0311 Further Supplementary Statement of Steven Blackburn, 7 June 2021, Annexure a.

67 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3033, 3050.

68 Exhibit RC0696 Minutes of Crown Resorts board meeting, 24 May 2021.

69 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 635 [100].

Reviewed 25 October 2021

Volume 3