
# Royal Commission into Casino Operator and Licence

Forensic review - AML/CTF

5 July 2021

Appendices to Report dated 5 July 2021





# **APPENDIX A** Engagement terms



This document revisits the scope set out in the Workplan dated 19 April 2021 (the Workplan) which forms the basis of McN's work.

The Workplan was prepared under the then assumption that unfettered access to Crown would be obtained. The blue text identifies those aspects of the Workplan which were dependent on this access. Subsequently, the modus operandi has changed and McN's work is being conducted via Interviews, Survey, Questionnaires and Focus Groups.

The table below replicates in the first 4 columns the scope as set out in the Workplan and in the final column identifies how the scope is to be covered by the current methodology and notes any variations the the scope araising from the change of methodology or matters of information which has arisen since the Workplan was agreed.

Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
A: Preparatory	Review key available background material	A.1	Review of Bergin and Sixth Review Reports for identified AML issues including  Unreported ML indicators (to inform issue B below)  Framework, policy, governance issues (to inform issue C below)	No change
		A.2	Review Project Libby <sup>1</sup> scope and methodology and Crown's progress report to ILGA <sup>2</sup> and identify any concerns regarding how it responds to Bergin and regulatory concerns identified including in terms of coverage, timing and interim exposure to ML risks.	No change

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Understood to the project being undertaken by Crown to remediate its business as recommended by the Bergin Report with a view to obtaining a licence to operate the Barangaroo casino

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Doc CRW.521.003.0075 Letter from ILGA to Crown 1 April 2021



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
B: Indications of money laundering in patron accounts post 2019	Review Deloitte engagement letter and report re patron accounts audit	B.1	Review Deloitte engagement letter, Phase 3 preliminary scope (memo), draft Phase 1 report and Crown's progress reports to regulators.  Consider:  Alignment of scope to ILGA/Bergin's requirements and the Commission's requirements to identify indications of money laundering through patron accounts post December 2019  Time period covered, accounts covered, nature of analysis, time to complete  Progress reports and whether findings indicate additional investigation appropriate  Identify any matters of potential interest for the Commission arising from any limitations of scope or from findings to date and provide recommendations for additional work to be undertaken, if required to meet the Commission's objectives.	Also considering Deloitte evidence of 26 May 2021.  No additional forensic work (on transactions in bank accounts) by McN recommended.  Acting on basis that Deloitte will report on Phase 2 by 25 June and McN will review those findings
	Discussion with relevant Crown personnel regarding the advent and use of Riverbank and Southbank accounts		Obtain full briefing from relevant Crown personnel of Crown's investigations into Southbank and Riverbank accounts including:  Scope of any investigations undertaken  When, why and how accounts opened  Usage by patrons – transaction volumes in number and value through life of accounts; details of patron usage  Accessibility – how account details were made known to patrons	To be addressed through interviews with:  Nick Stokes Adam Sutherland Steven Hancock Mart Gioras Review of GT reports GT and Consideration of GT and Initialism documents and evidence to Commission



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
B: Indications of money laundering in patron accounts post 2019 cont'	Discussion with relevant Crown personnel regarding the advent and use of Riverbank and Southbank accounts cont'	B.2	<ul> <li>Record keeping by Crown – including into SYCO system or such other systems which subject transactions to AML monitoring and reporting</li> <li>Details of the sweeping of accounts to Crown accounts – basis, frequency and value</li> <li>Responses to bank inquiries / escalation of issue within Crown</li> <li>Measures taken to prevent similar ML indicative activity by other means once Riverbank and Southbank accounts were closed</li> </ul>	•
	Investigate patron activity subsequent to the closure of Riverbank and Southbank accounts for patron accounts which indicated	B.3	Identify the patron accounts which GT/Initialism/Deloitte found showed indication of ML activity in the Riverbank and Southbank accounts (R&S Patrons).  Review any analysis, investigation or other actions carried out by Crown in respect of patrons whose activity within Riverbank and Southbank was indicative of ML.  If not already analysed by Crown:	To be progressed following interview with Stokes and Finance/cage and count team –  to confirm understanding of patron account and DAB account intersections  to understand patron review project
	ML activity through those accounts.		<ul> <li>Obtain from Crown data of all transactions for R&amp;S         Patrons post December 2019</li> <li>Analyse this data to identify any ongoing indications of ML involving the same patrons</li> </ul>	Understood that exemption to access SYCO information is required for this to occur.  Consider whether doing this work will add to findings from Deloitte analysis or stand as illustrative that:  a) Deloitte scope was informed solely as a path to the Sydney licence; and  b) Little appetite on Crown's part to truly inquire as to the activities of patrons fiund to be implicated



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
	Review and observe controls implemented under New AML Regime in respect of Patron Accounts	B.4	Using the review of patron account controls within the New AML Regime as identified by Deloitte <sup>3</sup> , undertake review, inquiry of relevant staff, observation and sample testing in relation to the following matters:  Nature and extent of training provided to staff regarding controls  Staff understanding of the controls  Compliance with processes to give effect to controls  Completeness of controls and any vulnerabilities within processes  Resolution of identified issue of transactions aggregation  Issues which have arisen as controls have been implemented and how they have been addressed  Staff empowerment issues – including both:  ability and willingness to escalate observed issues or shortcomings; and  capacity to override controls  Reporting of control effectiveness (eg incidences of funds not accepted, incidences of discretionary override and reasons)  Quality control / audit processes applied to new controls over patron accounts and review the QC results.  Governance oversight of implementation of New AML Regime in regard to patron accounts  Processes for extension of credit to patrons and application of New AML Regime to such accounts  Other matters which come to our attention in the course of discussion and observation	Addressed by combination of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In its draft report dated 26 March 2021



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
	Assess sustainability of patron account controls	B.5	Identify the extent of, and time required to implement, manual controls and the volume being managed at present.  Determine the current transaction levels and forecast transaction levels as COVID eases.  Consider sustainability of current manual approach to controls and review plans to mitigate this risk and any plans to resolve through automation; consider timing and effectiveness.	Addressed by combination of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups
	Discuss and observe KYC controls and processes for patrons (those with patron accounts)	B.6	Identify KYC processes embodied in New AML Regime as they relate to patron accounts and through discussion with relevant personnel, review of records, observation of implementation of controls consider:  KYC policies and procedures applied to patron accounts including due diligence procedures and the documents used for each customer category  Process for KYC data collection  Use and effectiveness of SYCO system  Other tools and processes used for KYC and patron identification purposes  Process for identifying PEP's or sanctioned persons  Criteria for customer risk assessment and categorisation  DD and EDD and ongoing DD processes and triggers for escalation of DD	Addressed by combination of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups covering both patron accounts and on the floor processes.  KYC actions processes will be addressed in focus groups but direct observations will not be undertaken.



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
	Discuss and observe KYC controls and processes for patrons (those with patron accounts) cont	B.6	<ul> <li>External providers for conducting KYC checks</li> <li>Processes where high risk results are returned</li> <li>Processes where identify cannot be verified</li> <li>Reporting of KYC issues and actions taken</li> <li>Basis and extent of multiple patron account numbers – effect of multiple patron accounts on AML risk or ML indicator analyses</li> <li>Reporting of KYC issues and actions taken</li> <li>Basis and extent of multiple patron account numbers – effect of multiple patron accounts on AML risk or ML indicator analyses</li> <li>Reporting of KYC issues and actions taken</li> <li>Basis and extent of multiple patron account numbers – effect of multiple patron accounts on AML risk or ML indicator analyses</li> <li>DD and EDD processes and triggers for escalation of DD</li> <li>Reporting of KYC issues and actions taken</li> <li>Nature and frequency of review of KYC program effectiveness</li> </ul>	
C: Assessment New AML Regime	Gain understanding of New AML Regime and key changes	C.1	Discuss with Crown personnel the changes that have been made to AML policies and processes in response to the inquiry and changes that are planned to be implemented, including:  Review documentation outlining scope of changes Review ML risk assessment and Crowns Risk Appetite statements and documentation Review AML compliance plan	Addressed by combination of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups  Specific focus on the Blackburn plan accepted by the Board on 24 May 2021 and interviews focussing on risks to its implementation.  Reduced focus on internal audit activity given Blackburn's assessment, accepted by Board, that this was lacking.



Issue	Summary of Task	Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
	Gain understanding of New AML Regime and key changes cont'	<ul> <li>Review timeline of changes / improvements to be implemented</li> <li>Consideration of the capability of Crown personnel to effectively and efficiently implement the planned improvements and to gap fill pending implementation</li> <li>Identification of methods and programs in place to test internal controls (including for example penetration testing or "mystery shopper" programs)</li> <li>Review of internal audit programs and recent internal audit reports insofar as they relate to ML risks and New AML</li> <li>Regime controls</li> </ul>	
D: Money laundering on the floor	Assess controls to deter, identify and report ML indicative activity on the floor including in respect of known ML typologies	D.1 Through interviews with Crown (AML Team) and on-site review of documentation:  • identify the controls and processes in place to deter, detect and report ML generally  • identify the controls and processes in place to deter, detect and report specific ML typologies to which casinos are vulnerable on the floor  Obtain evidence of the existence and effectiveness of controls by:  • discussion with internal audit (or other appropriate personnel) and review of Crown's internal audit or other testing of control compliance and effectiveness; and  • observation and discussion with relevant floor personnel.	Addressed by combination of interviews, questionnaires and focus groups and reviews of Deloitte (Phase 1), Promontory and Initialism reports and evidence.  Evidence to be obtained through Deloitte (Phase 1) work and focus group.  Reduced focus on internal audit given Blackburn's assessment, accepted by Board, that this was lacking.



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
	Floor walkthroughs and observation of implementation of controls	D.2	Conduct walkthroughs of relevant transactions on the floor with Crown staff addressing:  Access and surveillance activities – of staff and customers (security)  Cash / chip handling procedures (dealers, cage staff)  KYC processes at the cage Incident escalation procedures (floor staff)  Gaming machine supervision	Addressed to a degree in surveys and situational hypotheticals to be "walked through" in in focus groups.
	Employee integrity	D.3	Gain understanding, through discussion with Crown staff (HR and training) and on-site review of relevant materials, information and reports, of:  Hiring processes – sourcing, vetting and risk management.  Staff training including in regard to cash handling, AML and integrity risks  Disciplinary processes and tolerance policy  Record of disciplinary actions in respect of control failures  Performance management and detection/prevention of employee corruption	Group interview with HR and customer integrity personnel.



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
E: Know Your Customer (KYC)	Review KYC policies and procedures	E.1	Identify KYC processes embodied in New AML Regime as they relate to customers (other than patron accounts which is addressed at B.6) and through discussion with relevant personnel, on-site inspection of records, and observation of implementation of controls consider:  KYC policies and procedures including due diligence procedures and the documents used for each customer category  Process for KYC data collection  Use and effectiveness of SYCO system  Other tools and processes used for KYC and patron identification purposes  Process for identifying PEP's or sanctioned persons  Criteria for customer risk assessment and categorisation  DD and EDD and ongoing DD processes and triggers for escalation of DD  External providers for conducting KYC checks  Processes where high risk results are returned  Processes where identify cannot be verified  Reporting of KYC issues and actions taken  Ongoing internal testing of KYC processes that take place  Nature and frequency of review of KYC program effectiveness	Same actions here for other floor as undertaken for patron accounts (Issue B- action B.6).  Covered by actions outlined for B.6



Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
F: 'Sentinel' ML data analytics	Ascertain whether the automated 'Sentinel' program is fit for purpose using data analytics and testing	E.1	Review, assess and understand the 'rules' within Sentinel which are used to detect indications of money laundering. This will include but is not limited the following:  - ascertain whether the Sentinel 'rules', if properly applied, identify all behaviour which is required to be identified and reported under the AML/CTF Act and Crown's compliance plan  - analyse the code for each rule to confirm that it properly gives effect to the rule  - identify the processes for ingesting data into the Sentinel system to ensure the data sets subject to Sentinel analysis is complete  - review Crown's processes for testing and interpreting results  Whilst undertaking the above work we will identify practical ways to test the Sentinel system, which may include testing the system by:  - deliberately (potentially covertly) inputting transactions into the live data which ought to be identified by Sentinel and assessing the results; and/or  - obtaining sample replica data set(s) and adding transactions which ought to be identified by Sentinel, then running Sentinel over both data sets and comparing the results and/or  - obtaining sample replace data set(s) and subjecting it to testing using code we write to replace or augment the Sentinel rules and comparing the results returned by Sentinel	Interviews with Sentinel team – strategic, technical and operational.  Having gained a more detailed understanding of the system, stage of implementations and potential vulnerabilities; recommendations as to testing options will be discussed with RCCOL solicitors and counsel.




Issue	Summary of Task		Key actions	Comment on how covered by current methodology or variations required
G: Reporting	Draft report of findings and recommendations for further investigations	G.1	Report on investigations and identify areas of concern or weakness and, as appropriate, formulate recommendations for and scope of further investigations (as Phase 2)	

## **APPENDIX B** McGrathNicol Review of Patron Bank Accounts and DAB Accounts

The data analytics work undertaken is provided in a separate electronic document (pdf) which includes the following output.

<b>B1</b>	METHODOLOGY
<b>B2</b>	PARKING OF FUNDS DATASET
<b>B3</b>	TRANSACTIONS INDICATIVE OF STRUCTURING DATASET: 24 HRS
<b>B4</b>	TRANSACTIONS INDICATIVE OF STRUCTURING DATASET: 48 HRS
<b>B5</b>	TRANSACTIONS INDICATIVE OF STRUCTURING DATASET: 72 HRS
<b>B6</b>	THIRD PARTY TRANSFER RISK DATASET: ALL INSTANCES
<b>B7</b>	THIRD PARTY TRANSFER RISK DATASET: POST 8 APRIL 2020
<b>B8</b>	THIRD PARTY TRANSFER RISK DATASET: POST 21 OCTOBER 2020
<b>B9</b>	THIRD PARTY TRANSFER RISK DATASET: POST 16 NOVEMBER 2020
B10	TITO BEHAVIOUR EXAMPLES

## APPENDIX C Summary of ML Vulnerabilities and weaknesses of Crown's controls



<sup>151</sup> Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector, Financial Action Task Force, 2019

<sup>152</sup> CRW.512.112,0034: Annexure B: Crown's Response to Recommendations and Findings in Promontory Vulnerability Assessment dated 24 May 2021





## APPENDIX D Sentinel Rules

#### **Automatic Transaction Monitoring Rules**

Below is a table outlining the proposed automatic transaction monitoring rules along with the logic behind the rule, the relevant ML/TF risk assessment the rule is aiming to address, and the implementation status. This data is drawn from Initialism's assessment of the proposed rules<sup>1</sup>.

Crown Rule Reference	Logic	ML / TF Risk Objective	Implementation Status
AL1			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL2			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL3			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL4			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL5			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL6			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL7			Deployed, phase 2 proposed update and merge with AL8 forming Crown Rule Reference AL24 <sup>2</sup>
AL8			Deployed, phase 2 proposed update and merge with AL7 forming Crown Rule Reference AL24 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Initialism Crown Resorts Transaction Monitoring Review May 2021 (CRW.512.072.0128)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As noted in the Sentinel Overview v0.5 (CRW.510.047.1038)

Crown Rule Reference	Logic	ML / TF Risk Objective	Implementation Status
AL9			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL10			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL11			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
L12			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
NL13			Deployed, phase 2 proposed change and update Crown Rule Reference to AL25 <sup>2</sup>
L14			Deployed, phase 2 proposed change and update Crown Rule Reference to AL23 <sup>2</sup>
L15			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
L16			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
L17			Deployed <sup>2</sup>

Crown Rule Reference	Logic	ML / TF Risk Objective	Implementation Status
AL18			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
AL19			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
AL20			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
L21			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
L22			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
L27			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
.L28			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
L29			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
BD			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
BD			Planned for phase 3 deployment <sup>1</sup>
tisk Metrics – Cash Transact	ions		
			Deployed <sup>2</sup>
			Deployed <sup>2</sup>

## **APPENDIX E** Survey of First line of Defence employees


In this appendix we set out the results of the survey of employees in roles across the Cage, Table Games, Electronic Games, Surveillance, VIP Services and Security teams to gain their views in relation to AML/CTF matters. The results include all quantitative responses. A balanced selection of qualitative responses has been provided together with McGrathNicol's assessment of the themes of the comments made by respondents.



Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
In your own words please describe your understanding of the term "money laundering".	<ul> <li>Sample of comments from respondents¹:</li> <li>When a criminal exchanges illegally earned money for clean money through a legitimate business</li> <li>It's a person or patron that has obtained money illegally and attempts to clean the money onw way or another to make it look like it has been earned legitimately</li> <li>Taking money from unethical sources (crime/theft/drugs) and converting into clean money through various means.</li> <li>Concealing origin of illegally acquired money</li> <li>Money laundering is an illegal act of transferring or borrowing money through foreign/local banks to use for gambling or any other illegal transactions.</li> <li>Channeling criminally acquired funds through a financial system by depositing and/or exchanging funds for other forms of currency.</li> <li>Use difference way which seems legally to washout the dirty money ( which from criminal behaviour, ) become the legal money</li> </ul>	Overall is appears that staff understand the general concept of money laundering. Some staff were able to explain the concept in more detail than others were.

Section 2.2: Money Laundering

At the current time, in your own opinion, how likely is it that money laundering is occurring at Crown Melbourne?



#### Sample of comments from respondents:

- "Have often seen people force feeding small notes into electronic gaming machines without playing and cashing out, usually late on a Friday or Saturday night presumably form drug sales"
- "It is the easiest place to launder cash and the number one place in Melbourne to do so. Crown deals with enormous volumes of cash in their daily business operations. And because of that a member of the public who walks into the casino with large amounts of cash does not raise red flags."
- "A number of ways a cash transaction can be made unsupervised. And a loyalty program that allows allows a member to put money on there membership card."
- "Money laundering can happen on a small scale, for eg, under the \$10,000 ID check laws, people know this."
- "I see patrons make \$5k cash changes in premium areas without placing bets. This is more small-scale than other alleged money laundering that has occurred."
- "There is still a lot of people changing multiple \$5,000 cash changes on multiple tables without any play.
- "It happen all the time, some patrons change a few thousands at each table, then walk away. Patrons eventually just change all the chips to cash (clean money). Patrons are smart too, they would change less than 10000, and move on to change at another cage or come back to change every few hours. Most table game managers/supervisors would do nothing about it, when they were reported to.
- "If I opened a business ... I would turn a blind eye if I was raking in the dough. It's just human nature, Greed!"


- ~50% of on-the-floor survey respondents indicated they believe money laundering is occuring through Crown Melbourne at the current time
- Staff who rated this risk as "unlikely" focused on the new systems, processes and procedures, which have been implemented since the Bergin Inquiry and Royal Commission. Main procedures include Source of Wealth and improved UAR reporting.
- Due to the new processes implemented and increased scrutiny surrounding ML some survey participants thought it was unlikely the ML is currently occurring.
- Multiple participants referred to lockdown, COVID, no junkets, no international visitors and the use of SOF and SOW procedures.

- "Groups of gamblers buying in individually under the \$10k reporting threshold then playing and swapping chips amongst eachother as a group"
- "I have witnessed, been involved in and directed to knowingly circumvent AusTrac/AML laws and policies."
- There are some gaming locations at Crown where patron can play without identifying themselves. They then attend the cage to cash out their chips which can't be verified as the patrons don't have any ratings. this makes it very difficult to follow our AML processes as not having rated play makes it very difficult to confirm the ownership of the chips. This then can lead to patrons structuring their cashouts."
- "Due to the large amount of cash transactions and countless combinations of places for cash to change hands it would be naive so assume it does not happen."
- "Crown bends the rules for big players"
- "I believe that with all the proactive work Crown has been doing, money laundering has definitely decreased. However I don't believe it is able to ever be completely wiped out anywhere - not just the casino."
- "At the current time there is a greater focus on patrons and staff. Many patrons are likely choosing to find other options to launder their finances. With that said, we are still seeing many of the same regulars 5-7 days a week for extended periods each day. I consider this suspicious behaviour that is likely not being tracked."
- "Patrons knew the rule of under \$10k payment does not require to provide ID and they can always claim I give half of the money to my friend if it is split payout between two people which combine more than \$10k"
- "There are no checks being done from a dealers position"
- The scrutiny that Crown has been placed under means that everyone takes concerns more seriously than before. Any questions of money laundering are being looked at seriously
- I think the way things currently are right now, it would be very hard for instances of money laundering to slip through undetected as everyone is hyper vigilant right now.
- I believe it's unlikely because Crown is under investigation. Crown is taking extra precaution
  to prevent it from happening. Crown is more strict with large amounts of money and looking
  into the source.
- I think SOW and SOF does their job to scare away people who are money laundrying
- Currently all staff are focused on identifying money laundering, it would be unlikely it would go unnoticed.
- The checks we are doing now make it very difficult for patrons to bring in large amounts of cash and very hard for them to get verified winners cheques.
- Strict protocols have been implemented to minimise money laundering risk. Relationships with high risk customers are being reviewed and ended where necessary.
- A very robust AML process is now in place with all staff having been trained

Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
		Our new AML and SOF policies make it extremely difficult to launder money.	
		I think it's more unlikely at the moment given that there are no international players due to the COVID situation worldwide.	
		Training, policy and procedure changes and strict adherence to policy and AML guidelines.	

Section 2.3: Money Laundering


Thinking back to the times before COVID, in your opinion, how likely is it that money laundering activities were then being undertaken at Crown?





- You could ask a cleaner and they'd tell you they knew of active laundering! I was once told to ignore suspicious activities like loan sharking as there was "no way to prove it". I was not aware of the rules regarding exchanging funds within the Sun City Pit 86 gaming area and yet often witnessed large sums of money being processed by staff. They would keep the door open and there was no fear of being caught out.
- It happened daily
- While I highly doubt it was being done BY Crown, there was not enough due diligence made to discover where funds were coming from, nor was there much attempt to stop any sources that seemed suspicious.
- Prior to COVID there was a sense of apathy when it came to the understand and investigation
  of ML. I think, when it was reported, it was investigated, but staff were just as likely to look
  the other way as they were to actually report what they saw.
- An example of how money laundering occurs. Members of the public walk into the casino
  with a large amount of cash in small denominations such as \$10 and \$20 notes. The average
  person does not carry large sums of money in this manner. I have witnessed this type of
  activity on a weekly basis, usually on a Monday or Tuesday.
- Cash Pits like maple or pit 17 are extremely lucrative to Crown as we call them the cash pits for all the small businesses in Melbourne to launder cash / none taxed monies. Also other unsavoury characters visit these main Gaming floor venues to hid if you like, ie not seen in more exposed areas like Mahogany Room for example. We see many questionable things working in and around these place and we are from another department.


- 72% of on-the-floor survey respondents indicated that they believe money laundering was occurring through Crown Casino prior to COVID.
- Staff have either personally witnessed, been told by colleagues, sensed it was accepted or assumed it must happen due to the nature of Casinos.
- A small number of participants believe that Crown's procedures would not allow any money laundering to occur (pre-covid)


Questi	on Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
	<ul> <li>I once brought to attention suspicious behaviour of a patron with multiple cashexchanges but not playing. The manager told me not to worry about it and didn't take any action. We did training on the subject, but when on the floor live, told to ignore it.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>often id see people coming in, with large amounts of cash and never play. easily just walk out the door again. Informing management never worked.</li> </ul>	
	I have seen the same people do large cash changes. All of which are under the threshold of 10,000. Even when they have been 10,000 the were offered to take \$100 back if they didn't have ID.	
	<ul> <li>It happen all the time. Some managers/supervisors would just turn a blind eye because it is not their job to stop patrons from changing cash to chips and chips to cash.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>It was very common practise in Premium rooms to assist patrons avoid AusTrac requirements</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>We followed the rules but no one really cared to do more then the minimum</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>I have observed players inserting significant amount of money into ETG and then cash out without playing. I did report it but i believe nothing was done about it.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Lax attitude towards enforcing some policies unless the situation was 'blatantly obvious'.</li> <li>Using the term 'Grey Area' repeatedly</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Dealers were taught ways to help players to avoid austrec declaration when they changed cash to chips.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>At on floor level all rules were adhered to however there was some questionable things allowed at a much higher level</li> </ul>	






























Section 3.18: Training


Is the new AML Portal system an improvement of the way Crown used to do reporting of transactions or behaviour? You may provide a comment with your answer.




- I have only ever submitted through the AML Portal but I find the function very user friendly
  and find being able to attach screenshots of suspicious transactions to be very useful.
- It is a good first step but requires more face-to-face training to cover the vast "grey" area that is found in a casino environment
- Simple to use and secure.
- IMMENSELY improved. There was very little system in place before and it was not necessarily
  encouraged or coached on how to use it.
- Prior to the new AML Portal system there weren't any avenues to report.
- Much easier to use than the old SMR
- Never used or been shown any system
- never seen it, been trained on it or used it
- I have never used the old or new portal. I have always reported unusual activity to my Manager verbally.
- I havnt not heard of portal. I am a dealer so I believe Area Managers do it.
- Crown has made us aware of the portal and shown us links but has not given us any training during shift hours on it
- Have never been shown anything on AML
- Not sure as this is handle by a higher position than myself.
- Honestly, I've heard and seen posts about AML portal but haven't looked into it

- 51% of survey respondents indicated they don't know whether the new AML portal is an improvement on how transactions and behaviour are reported.
- Participants noted the new UAR system is easily accessible, user friendly and streamlined.
- Multiple participants noted they have never used the system or been trained on how to use it. Staff have been made aware of the portal but not shown how to use it, many participants still report suspicious behaviour verbally to their managers who potentially lodge the UARs.
- It appears that UAR's and the portal is used by managers / area managers and the dealers don't input into the portal.





I feel supported by Crown and management to do my job effectively including in regard to reporting potential AML matters. You may provide a comment with your answer.




- Time and resources have always been immediately available for completing this task.
- In all my time at Crown, I have never been asked to "not report" or to "under report". My
  manager has always encouraged our team to complete and submit UAR's and previously
  SMR's as we see fit.
- Management will always listen to a potential problem, regardless of what that problem may be.
- It is actively encouraged now.
- AML is a big part of my teams compliance directives. I feel supported in this.
- Since January this year I feel supported.
- Management are very supportive in reporting any ML concerns
- I have always felt supported in this area and this feeling has increased with the recent changes to procedures and increased communications about this from senior leadership at Crown.
- Crown Management is working hard to make sure all staffs to have AML training.
- I feel supported however that support does not feel or seem genuine
- Again it depends on management. Some managers will go above and beyond to get to the issue. For some it is just a job they don't care or have very "old school" casino mentalities.
- There is a heightened awareness now compared to pre-Covid times in identifying and reporting potential AML matters

- 83% of survey respondents indicated they believe Crown and management support them in reporting potential AML matters.
- Responses range from noting that Crown has always encouraged reporting and supported staff to this being a significant change recently in the current climate with no processing, policies, training and vigilance promoted

1	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
		<ul> <li>I feel supported by my manager, but I lack trust in how senior execs use the information we acquire</li> </ul>	
		TG staff are largely ineffective when it comes to AML matters due to the customer service aspect. Surveillance will be the true investigators and can actually uncover AML matters.	

I have felt pressured by Crown employees to ignore, overlook or not report potentially suspicious behaviour which may indicate money laundering or other financial crime. You may provide a comment with your answer.



Never been pressured, but just read the room that there is general apathy about worrying

suspicious behaviour and only reporting what they absolutely found necessary

threshold transaction and management will ensure a blind eye is turned

I wouldn't use the word pressure. I would say that Crown had a history of ignoring potentially

Big players who clearly have far more than \$10,000AUD cash on their person (\$100,000+ in their bag or coat) will carefully ensure they change less than \$10,000 at a time to avoid a

In the past a manager has preferred to not show much interest in potentially suspicious cash

Not so much pressured as discouraged by the previous International Team when stepping


about money laundering in the parts of the casino I have worked.

transactions under the threshold limits.


into their sphere

- 79% of survey respondents indicated they have never felt pressured by other employees to overlook potentially suspicious behaviour.
- It does not appear based on the survey responses that employees feel pressure to overlook or not report potentially suspicious behaviour.
- It appears that as staff have no visibility of what happens when they report suspicious behaviour they may not feel encouraged or motivated to continue reporting.

l	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
		<ul> <li>With some patrons it would be indicated to to keep transaction under \$10,000. And play gaming machines where where no cheques are required or to to put money into their membership card</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Experienced colleagues may sometimes provide unsolicited feedback or conflicting interpretation of an event, often based off previous experience of accepted practices and/or customer rapport. Whilst the comments were not made with the intention to dissuade vigilance and promote money laundering, innocent comments can often create unintended pressure.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>When i do report it to a manager, nothing gets done.</li> </ul>	



VIP customers are treated just the same as the non-VIP customers when it comes to how they are observed and reported at the Casino. You may provide a comment with your answer.




- Absolutely not, VIP players are allowed to become intoxicated, assault staff, have sex in toilets, verbally abuse staff, spit at (or near) staff, and do dodgy transactions as a matter of routine in VIP areas.
- They pretty much have the run of the place, for instance I once had a VIP patron claim a losing bet was a colour change and her money was refunded, that wouldn't happen on the main floor
- VIPs are treated differently, they are VIPs.
- VIP customers are frequently treated in a preferential manner to non-VIP customers
- Vip customers get a completely different treatment momey talks
- They get better treatment and dealers to there liking
- VIP customers are given whatever they want whenever they want. Crown probably dont want to keep VIP's waiting so corners do get cut.
- Regarding AML they are treated the same, however undesirable behaviour ie: aggressive behaviour they are treated differently
- They are allowed special privileges. We are asked to bend SOPs when dealing with high values customers..
- There is a very clear distinction between VVIP customers and main gaming floor customers.
   My understanding of VVIP is there is greater leniency with those customers and what they are able to do.
- Please ... it's a Casino. They are what pays the bills so they are given more rein

- 25% of survey respondents indicated they <u>do not know</u> whether VIP customers are treated the same as non-VIP customers in regards to ML.
- 39% of survey respondents indicated they <u>do</u> believe that VIP customers are treated the same as non-VIP customers in regards to ML.
- 37% of survey respondents indicated they <u>do not</u> believe that VIP customers are treated the same as non-VIP customers in regards to ML.
- Survey participants who have experience working in VIP areas or positions strongly disagree that VIP customers are treated the same as non-vip customers. Some responses noted that this attitude may have changed in the last two years.
- Staff also noted that VIP customers are tracked and under more scrutiny regarding their play than non-VIP customers.

Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow h	ighlights)		McGrathNicol summary
		<ul> <li>VIP players are actually monitored more closely, however this is monitoring suspicious behavior and reporting it.</li> </ul>	not necessarily about		
		In the past I would answer this question as Disagree as there we did that were not reported. But now with the changes made / I reporting there is no differentiation. In fact I believe that the VI under more scrutiny and subjected to more reporting than a not subjected.	focus on compliance and P customers will now come		
		■ Given more leeway to cuss. But not as far as how monetary trail	nsactions go.		
		Post lockdown this has been exactly what I have witnessed n			
		<ul> <li>In my experience yes for cash, TT"s &amp; bank cheques. In hindsig ago should have happened for the possible structuring that occ accounts</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>In my experience, the VIP status of a customer has not been a cobservation and reporting. If anything, higher level players are to the inherent impact of their play on business.</li> </ul>			
		Crown sees and treats every customer with equality			
	How seriously do you perceive that Crown takes its	213 respondents answered this question		•/	65% of survey respondents indicated they believe Crown is taking its AML obligations seriously.
Experience	AML obligations?	16 (8%) 4 (2%)		•	25% of survey respondents indicated they believe Crown is taking its AML obligations somewhat seriously.
xbe			Answer		
5.4: E		54 (25%)	<ul><li>Very seriously</li></ul>		
on 5			Somewhat seriously    Not particularly seriously		
Section			Not particularly seriously  Not at all		
0,		139 (65%)			

I have observed staff acting, or being directed by other Crown staff to act in a way that is contrary to Crown's AML policies and procedures. You may provide a comment with your answer.



- I have seen lower staff allow reductions in buy in but they have then been subject to additional training on improving their vigilance.
- At times I've heard of staff that have forgotten to complete reporting but not maliciously.
- They don't tell you to ignore the rules. They just won't follow them up depending on management and prior to covid. I havnt seen this as an issue now.
- never have i seen a manager tell another staff member to look the other way
- I've been told to just let it go because they think he's all good, despite all that I've seen with the customer
- Not in ways contrary to AML policies, but rushing through procedures that are important, in order to allow the customer to begin gaming and keep them happy.
- I have occasionally observed staff neglecting their reporting obligations through lack of knowledge or lack of understanding of their and Crown's obligations. I have actively coached and educated several employees on the correct procedures and their obligations to ensure compliance.
- Usually with threshold transactions being divided or a friend ID being used
- In the previous international sphere there was less likely to be a report made in accordance with the AML rules
- In the past this was much more common, since the recent focus on AML this has not been true.
- Handing cash back if it's a threshold transaction when the customer doesn't have id.

- 70% of survey respondents indicated they have never observed staff acting or being direct to act in a way that is contrary to Crowns AML policies.
- It appears that most of the instances noted are due to a lack of training or awareness, not in order to deliberately breach AML policies. There were a few responses which related to threshold transactions being avoided with staff aware of what was happening.



Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
_	If you answered (a), (b) or (c) to question 43 and the activity or behaviour occurred in the last 3 months and was reported in accordance with Crown policy, please state the nature of the activity or behaviour witnessed.	Reported Incidents:	
ence		<ul> <li>A patron passed \$5,000 cash under the table to another patron who then bet with that cash.</li> <li>The original patron was rated correctly as having bought in with that cash</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Proxy betting over the phone. Patron identified. Betting stopped and removed by security.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Threshold transactions, Suspicious transactions just below the threshold, Large non-threshold transactions with little or no play</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Split payment between two or more patrons that combines total chips payout more than \$10k (different cashiers and or different cage).</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>I have observed just about every type of suspect transaction possible; structuring to avoid having to provide ID, large transactions not commensurate with rated play, loan sharking, unknown sources of chips and cash. They are usually reported by 3rd parties and investigated by my team.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Bill stuffing remote gaming terminals, Patrons presenting significant value of cash chips at the cage without corresponding gaming ratings, Patrons exchanging chips between each other, Large cash buy-ins with no rated gaming</li> </ul>	
: Experience		<ul> <li>A customer persistently not able to hand over Identification and then saying he had \$40,000 more in chips at home.</li> </ul>	
٦.8:		Potential bill stuffing by twocustomers, collecting cheques with minimal gaming activity	
Section		Patrons cashing in large amounts of cash in several different transactions	
Se		<ul> <li>people doing money exchange on the floor. E.G., patron can transfer another patron RMB and get AUD</li> </ul>	
		Structuring of chip cashouts	
		<ul> <li>I don't remember any specific incident. But at the end of the day, you don't know where people source their cash to gamble from. It seems like an impossible task to truly uncover.</li> </ul>	
		• Few patrons coming in at once with payout chips between \$4k - \$9500 for each patron.	
		<ul> <li>Customer X cashes out \$7,000. Customer Y cashes out \$5,000 and then hands that cash to Customer X.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Patrons exchanging relatively large amounts of cash for casino chips when they already have casino chips in their possession, but not sufficiently large that it hits any specific requirements to be reported.</li> </ul>	
		Reported to manager, unsure if it was submitted	
		Giving money back to avoid austrac transaction	

If you are aware of examples of indications of money laundering or suspicious behaviour not being reported in accordance with Crown policy, why do you think reporting is not done?

### Sample of comments from respondents:

- Too much hassle for Area Managers and not enough support from their superiors, who have an interest in permitting that behaviour
- Expediency, simply too much trouble for managers to both with
- Because uncovering money where customers source money is very difficult. This is beyond Crown's reach.
- Reporting is done by frontline workers as is required. Those reports have then been ignored at higher levels.
- Laziness, extra work.
- I am unaware of any such instances
- From my experience they are reported.
- Complacency and a feeling of "Not my responsibility". One example was the lack or initial reporting of large cash transactions occurring via the SunCity group and the money kept on hand by that group
- Reporting does not get done because often certain managers make us feel like we cannot
  approach them about issues. It's also dependent on the managers capabilities. In VIP, the VSE
  know each specific managers personality and we always have to cater to that. Often issues
  will not get reported if there are specific managers on as the staff do not feel they can
  approach those managers.

Furthermore, during an open discussion, one of our VIP managers asked a question to our Gaming Machines Operations Manager (now Integrity Manager) and was shut down. The VIP manager asked what staff should do if the manager they approach regarding an AML issue, doesn't listen to them, or even worse if a manager asks them to do something that is not compliant. The Integrity Manager simply stated "none of our managers would do that. They have all received training and that wouldn't happen."

For our upper managers to not even consider this could be a possibility is frustrating and definitely fosters an environment where staff just do not feel comfortable speaking up about things they see. And that wasn't even a VSE (frontline) staff that raised this issue, it was someone else of authority.


- The manager or managers think is not necessary because under \$10k payout.
- I am not aware of any examples, but my only guess would be ignorance regarding the process or ignorance regarding the behavior being suspicious.
- Due to the lack of knowledge people want to keep there jobs, bullying occurs
- Suspicious behaviour prior to January 2021 was not reported. Since the training in January of this year, suspicious behaviour seems to be reported.
- I am not aware of examples. However, lack of ethical reinforcement from management results in different interpretations of Crown's policy.

The most common responses by participants are below:

- Laziness / Extra Work
- They are all reported
- Management decide its not worth reporting staff unsure if it gets reported
- Lack of knowledge by staff
- Lack of ethical reinforcement of Crown policies
- Indifference by management

Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
	<ul> <li>50% of Management dont care, or are swamped with other work to follow it up. I believe not enough training is often given to managment so they dont feel they are capable of doing the task.</li> <li>50% do follow up and are effective at their job.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Not enough training for frontline staff. Not enough time on shift for us to properly have time to report ect. Management dont seem to care, seems to be a 'lets make as much money as possible, at any cost' motto Crown follow, pre-covid19 at least.</li> </ul>	
	I'm not aware of any But i would think that it is due to the persons own understanding and whether or not they formed the opinion of whether or not to report it.	
	<ul> <li>I am only aware of instances where this was not done due to misunderstanding of reporting requirements or obligations and once I became aware of this these instances were correctly reported.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Speaking for myself, I'm more interested in just getting through the shift. I'm not a big fan of the work culture there, so I go in and do what I think is expected of me then go home.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Staff unaware of the types of money laundering and do not have the training/experience to recognise it as being suspicious.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>The avenues for reporting exist, but it is inefficient. Bottom level employees expected to report such behaviour on their breaks, rather than on paid time.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>I think sometimes it's laziness and also lack of training for the managers.</li> </ul>	
	The gaming floor was too busy, the incidents might have slipped managers/supervisors' minds. Or they simply did not care, as it was more important to them about how much cash flow their gaming area made or an hour than where the money came from. There is hourly performance target for the gaming activities at each opened table game.	





Q Qu	estion	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
Do you have any observations regularized to levels of indication associated suspice activity?	parding the activity at the pared to pre- in relation cations of or	<ul> <li>Sample of comments from respondents:</li> <li>It's likely less but more is reported due to increased AML awareness among staff, the inclusion of repotting anything unusual not just suspicious and the use of the AML portal.</li> <li>The difference is night and day. Previously we were very good at reporting, but rarely investigated the source of funds. We have since created whole teams of industry experts who's only job is to investigate our patrons source of wealth/funds.</li> <li>Staff &amp; management are trained to be more alert</li> <li>It seems that international "VVIP" players are the epicentre of money laundering. As this has been severely curtailed by the pandemic it seems to have slowed down.</li> <li>Suspicious activity is more noticeable as there are less patrons. All department across the property are on the same page and the reporting of such activity is quickly acted upon.</li> <li>crown have become more vigilant at monitoring buy ins at table games</li> <li>There is a lot more reporting now. Staff are also reporting on a larger variety of indicators. It is clearly becoming a greater focus across the business.</li> <li>Crown has been very vigilant since coming back post covid and are very determined to keep the Casino clean and free of money laundering to the best of their abilities.</li> <li>The change in process now is significant compared to previous times</li> <li>There have been many changes made in regards to sending money to Crown bank accounts that have made "potential" laundering much more difficult if that is our patron's intentions. This also applies to cash presented at Crown.</li> <li>Both of these changes have made it much less likely that laundering is occurring.</li> <li>staff (particularly in Table Games) have been much more proactive in reporting suspicious activity. It's hard to tell if the volume of suspicious activity is higher or just how often it's being reported</li> <li>I think the same indicators exist. We're now just better trained and more aware of them. I'm also in</li></ul>	Main themes noted through survey responses are:  Less international visitors has noted a drop in potential money laundering  Media attention and inquiries have increased focus on AML and reporting  Suspicious activity is more noticeable now due to less customers

2	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
	What more do you think Crown could be doing to improve the deterrence, detection and reporting of money laundering or other financial crime?	<ul> <li>I believe we are doing very well now on this issue. The increased focus and process changes including KYC. The requirement for SOF forms to be completed once \$25k cash has been presented by a customer in a day. All brings more scrutiny on the financial transaction. Going cashless would be my only suggestion of improvement.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>More regulation within the frame work of the loyalty program. Regulation in the use of unsupervised automatic table games. More presence of vcglr staff on the gaming floor including VIP areas</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Increased staffing levels for the AML and Surveillance teams.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Going to a cashless system of gambling could all but eliminate money laundering.</li> <li>But that would be a major adjustment.</li> </ul>	
nce		<ul> <li>A training day aimed at all staff that is in person with a qualified staff member who is confident.</li> </ul>	
Experience		Teaching by government (not e-learning) employees on this subject.	
5.15: Exp		<ul> <li>Actually caring about it would help alot. Proper training for staff, promoting and encouraging staff to report it, and giving them time during work to even do so.</li> </ul>	
n 5.		<ul> <li>Physical Identification to be presented and recorded on every gaming floor entry point.</li> </ul>	
Section		<ul> <li>Crown should change their culture so they aren't so desperate for money. It's kind of embarrassing really. Simply stop being so money hungry and raise the standards.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Only accept bank transfers or have a tap an go system so we know all the money is coming from financial institutions.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>all players could be required to have carded play, that way money swapped for chips on tables or inserted to EGM's can be recorded as they move around and get unnoticed</li> </ul>	
		Working together with AUSTRAC and Law enforcement.	
		<ul> <li>The current approach is good so far. It shows patrons that they are not exempt or above the rules set out by the government and Crown.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>crown is doing everything possible to keep this matter in check</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Lower threshold transaction limits than those required by the Government.</li> <li>Better vetting of junket operators and members.</li> </ul>	

Please outline below any other matters that you feel would be important or valuable to share with the Commission, including in relation to money laundering or financial crime.

- The switch towards a greater use of electronic table games, where the customer plays on a screen rather than with a dealer directly, lends a new opportunity to potentially launder money while removing an element of direct human oversight. Players can feed money into the machine, take it out, feed that gaming ticket along with several others into another machine, take it out, consolidating smaller amounts into larger "winnings" all without necessarily having their actions seen or questioned by a dealer. This could lead to greater ease of "cleaning" smaller amounts of illegal funds, and when done by an organised group, could potentially result in large quantities of money being discretely laundered.
- You need outside people undercover that have the responsibility of looking for illegal activity
  on the Casino Floor. Hoping that 'Crown' Staff will report it is a fantasy
- All players in Pit 8, Maple Room should be carded. Too many patrons playing uncarded and funds can't be tracked. Patrons not being tracked for their buy ins, however then cash out large amounts of chips at the cages which can't be verified by their ratings.
- I think in gaming machines AML is spoken about and our managers tell us we should look out for it but I think it is all just to comply with crowns rules. I personally feel as though AML is taken seriously but is not very well explained to staff. In gaming machines, I am not sure what exactly I should be looking for. I know what money laundering is but not entirely sure how it directly could relate to gaming machines and what the obvious signs are. I do believe that if I was to report it to my managers they would report it to people higher up but once again I feel like that is just to comply with crowns rules and to meet report targets.
- The commission is purely costly theatre to appease the public that the government cares about these issues. The amount of tax the government receives from the casino is a great benefit to the public. The The casino cannot reasonably be expected to stop ALL money laundering and financial crimes. The procedures and policies in place are sufficient, but criminals will always take advantage of financial systems.
- In my time at Crown, I can list many many times where things have been either covered up, not reported to the VCGLR as required, or a blatant disregard for the law/casino control act have occurred. Long serving Middle Management is the issue, not the recent board members that resigned. They think they are above the law, and make decisions that are not in-line with Crown's policies or their requirements under the law.
- Crown is a sewer, the workplace culture is toxic and the company profits the more money comes in. Players are allowed to get away with murder so long as they keep playing. Crown's attitude toward the law and regulation is to be seen to do enough to keep the heat off, while continuing to push the envelope. Crown cannot be trusted to abide by the law, any serious investigation will prove damning. I encourage the commission to delve deep and not let Crown get off scot free
- I have seen with my own eyes a pokies player having there play button pinned in the play
  position and staff member standing there talking to them and not say anything. This was
  after the reports laid out in the government chamber my a member
- It was clear from early on that highly suspicious activity was occurring in the Sun City Salon in Pit 86. They never should have been allowed to operate their own cash desk. Unknown people would frequently come into the pit, deposit large amounts of cash, and then leave

	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
Т		immediately without playing. This behavior was regularly reported up the managerial chain but little ever happened.	
		<ul> <li>I continue to believe that it is our job to report suspicious and unusual activity. I will continue to do this whenever it occurs.</li> <li>In my opinion, Crown has always supported the reporting of unusual or suspicious activity.</li> <li>We are not the police and should not be expected to do their role.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>reporting has improved, and customer background checks have greatly improved, but more can always be done</li> </ul>	
		None really but I am at the bottom of the food chain in regards to Casino employees and I find it mind blowing how management allowed such dubious and highly unethical practices to be a part of every day business for Crown.  I believe that this comes from pressure to meet bottom line budgets and over the last decade we have seen job cuts, management restructures and tweaks to table games to increase the bottom line and when this can't be done anymore management looks for other ways to increase revenues.  Those employees whose remuneration is dependent on meeting or exceeding budget tend to lose sight of what is ethically right or wrong as they are more worried about getting a bonus. Just do the job for which you are paid for.  And a lot of these people are still in upper management positions, have they been asked why they allowed the highly questionable private gaming rooms and junket action to continue. I do feel that dealers are being preached about money laundering and suspicious activities but we are not the problem here, it is the management who allowed these practices to go on to keep the patron with the cash happy.	
		<ul> <li>The culture starts at the top and flows down I am not convinced that the current CEO has fully embraced the required change in culture from pre-Covid times</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>It is a very different world and culture here now than it was two years ago.</li> </ul>	
		■ The key issues raised over the last few years have related to junkets and other casino groups operating within Crown (Sun City, for example). These have had sweeping changes, where Crown no longer associates with these groups. Additional check are now performed on VIP patrons with much more scrutiny overall.  While I believe that ML issues can never be entirely eliminated from the casino, Crown is trying to address as many issues as it can.	
		Prior to January 2021 Crown had a no questions asked approach to customers brining money into the casino. e.g. the amount brought in, amount gambled away, was the patrons private business. Staff were not encouraged to question or report suspicious behaviour. VIP's were treated in this way to a greater degree than the general public.	
		<ul> <li>As previously mentioned, the maple room is an area where patron can play "under the radar".</li> <li>This then makes it extremely difficult to follow our AML procedures when patrons come to cash out as we are unable to verify their play.</li> </ul>	

# APPENDIX F Survey of AML, Compliance and Risk employees

## Results


In this appendix we set out the results of the survey of employees in roles across the AML, Compliance, Risk assurance and audit and Legal teams to gain their views in relation to AML/CTF matters. The results include all quantitative responses. A balanced selection of qualitative responses has been provided together with McGrathNicol's assessment of the themes of the comments made by respondents.







Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
Section 2.1 :Money laundering	In your own words please describe your understanding of the term "money laundering".	<ul> <li>Sample of comments from respondents¹:</li> <li>'A process (through minimal gambling, money transfer etc.) whereby someone tries to covert money that was obtained 'illegally' or 'illegitimately' into 'clean' or 'legitimate' money.'</li> <li>'Money laundering is the process whereby the proceeds of crime are placed, layered then integrated into the banking systems for the purpose of legitimization.'</li> <li>'The process through which a criminal group deals with money in a way that conceals its criminal origin and gives it the appearance of having been legitimately obtained.'</li> <li>'Under Australian law, money laundering will commonly relate to both (a) dealing with the proceeds or instruments of crime, as well as (b) the process of obfuscating the illicit nature of funds through the stages of placement, layering and integration.'</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Survey participants who answered this question provided clea and accurate descriptions of money laundering.</li> </ul>


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> These are verbatim comments, no corrections have been made to spelling or grammar





Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
	At the current time, in your own opinion, how likely is it that money laundering is occurring at Crown Melbourne?	• All banks and non-bank financial institutions (of which Crown is one) are targeted by money launderers seeking to introduce or layer proceeds of crime during the money laundering cycle. This occurs at all levels of crime, from street level drug dealers seeking to introduce small sums of several thousand dollars, to senior organised crime figures seeking to integrate large amount of funds for their use and enjoyment (or reinvestment). No bank or NBFI is able to prevent money laundering perfectly, and casinos (among others) are therefore always going to be targeted to be the victim of money launderers.	
ey laundering		It is impossible to completely eliminate the risk that customers are dealing with the proceeds of crime while participating in gaming activity at any casino, just as it would be for traditional banking customers interacting with the financial system. However, Crown is hardening the environment against these risks through additional controls and monitoring, to reduce the impact and scale of these risks.	
2.3: Money		<ul> <li>As a Casino operator, Crown is susceptible to Money laundering. Casinos are a common vehicle across the world for criminals to clean their money and casinos have controls in place to mitigate that risks.</li> </ul>	
Section		■ The Casino is vulnerable to ML. You cannot eliminate it however you can disrupt and deter such activity through identification and mitigation. In fairness to the casino sector, it's my view that no one in the financial sector such as banks could say ML is not occurring in their business.	
		<ul> <li>Crown has a large number of processes in place to assist with ensuring money laundering does not occur, however, it is still likely that it occurs.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Over the years we have strengthened our AML training across all departments and staff are alert to large transactions involving cash</li> </ul>	
		■ This has become a huge focus with training upgraded to invlude more examples of what to look out for as well as a push for "any doubt speak up and report"	












































Q	Question	Responses (McGrathNicol yellow highlights)	McGrathNicol summary
	Please outline below any other matters that you feel would be important or valuable to share with the Commission, including in relation to money laundering or financial crime.	While my tenure at Crown, I have really seen a more enhanced and detailed attention to tackling financial crime. Furthermore, there has been a significant shift in culture for the better and there is really been a push to do the right thing. Not commenting on the past processes given I was not working at Crown at the time, I do really believe Crown has opened up to feedback and is working hard, efficiently and quickly to enhance its processes around compliance and combatting AML.	<ul> <li>The comments by employees indicate a belief in Crown's commitment to high standards of AML/CTF policies, processes and compliance to combat ML/CTF.</li> <li>The position promulgated by the respondents is that the criticisms Crown has received relate to past events and management decisions and were not matters that distinguished Crown from other casinos in the region. The view is put that Crown already exceeds the minimum standard</li> </ul>
9		<ul> <li>My time at Crown has demonstrated to me that as an organization, Crown has continued to train staff on AML/CTF matters, and other relevant training. Crown has enforced a culture of compliance and integrity since I commenced working for Crown.</li> </ul>	and on a path to being world leading, well beyond current regulatory standards.
5.13: Experience		■ I'm privileged to be part of a team involved in the uplift of compliance relating to AML. My view is that Crown is already exceeding the minimum standards required by legislation, and within the next 6-12 months, Crown will have the strongest and most effective AML regime of any Casino in Australia (confident it already does).	
Section		<ul> <li>Many bad decisions were made by those in higher management (who are no longer with us) and I feel a lot of their decisions were directly linked to their bonuses and remuneration.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Crown's past is behind it and it is a new Crown and focus should be on the future not past matters which may have occurred over 4, 5 to 10 years ago.</li> </ul>	
		■ The steps Crown has taken in the last 24 months to identify, manage and mitigate ML/TF risk are ahead of what the broader industry is doing. What started under its previous management and continues to do today will be world leading, beyond industry standards and will far exceed regulatory requirements. I think the Commission would benefit to understand what other casinos in the Asia Pacific Region are doing in relation to identifying, managing and mitigating ML/TF risks both now and before the issues with Crown were identified to get an understanding of what the industry standards are (and were pre mid 2019).	

## APPENDIX G Focus group themes, controls and observations

Theme	Focus Group Observations Previous state	Focus Group Observations  Current state
ML Awareness (OTF)	<ul> <li>Participants attending the focus groups claimed to have an adequate awareness of AML prior to the Bergin Inquiry.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Generally good AML awareness post Bergin Inquiry as a result of training (online or face- to-face appropriate to level and role), communication and team meetings.</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	Prior to lockdownprior to the Bergin Report, AML	was a thing of course"
	McGrathNico  It appears that employees have an increased as increased training and communication.	ol observation: wareness of ML since the Bergin Inquiry due to
ML Examples That participants were are aware happen, but have not necessarily seen themselves	<ul> <li>'Bill stuffing' (swapping tainted notes for 'clean' tickets or notes) through TRT, eTG or EGM – this would be relatively small scale, a money launderer would need to spend significant time on the property to generate a quantity of laundered cash.</li> <li>Purchase a TITO ticket from another player, convert to cheque and claim that the TITO as winnings.</li> <li>Converting illicit funds into winnings by collusive even-money betting – most likely this would occur at eTG on games such as roulette rather than at a table as less obvious than at a table (e.g. two players in collusion betting red/black odds/evens on Roulette or even, at an EGM, on the same terminal).</li> </ul>	As for previous state
	McGrathNicol observation: The focus groups were able to provide hypothetical adequate knowledge of basic methods used to laun	
Experienced an actual ML Incident?	<ul> <li>Impossible for a staff member to determine whether what they have observed / what they have reported on a UAR is ML – many UARs are submitted (about 20 per day) but it is not possible to determine whether this is indicative of actual ML as OTF staff never hear an outcome of investigations undertaken.</li> <li>Participants in the AML / Compliance focus group indicated that after they have passed on information to the police or AUSTRAC they are not notified of the outcome, therefore they are unable to determine whether ML has actually occurred.</li> <li>If Crown AML personnel do hear from law enforcement about an investigation into ML (where law enforcement will seek evidence), significant time has elapsed from the time the SMR has been submitted.</li> </ul>	As for previous state.

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
	McGrathNicol observation: It appears that it has not been possible to determin due to the lack of information received from law en	
Suspected an actual ML Incident?	<ul> <li>Situations have occurred where customers have purchased chips at a table, looked disinterested and not played every game, then repeated this at multiple tables before cashing-out with most of the original chips purchased. While this could be indicative of ML it could also be consistent with normal gaming behaviours.</li> <li>Participants indicated that they have witnessed customer behaviours such as large amounts of cash being brought in, observations relating to gaming machines such as bill stuffing, suspicious 'body language' and customers 'trading' tickets. It is impossible however from these limited one-time observations to determine whether these behaviours are indicative of ML.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Participants reported that bill stuffing commonly occurs.</li> <li>Cage staff have indicated that it is sometimes possible to identify illegal money.</li> <li>A situation occurred where a customer attempted to enter multiple tickets (ranging from \$1,000-\$2,000 each) into the same machine, however when they tried to take them out as one ticket, the machine locked. Investigations were undertaken including review of the machine's history and it was discovered that the tickets had come from multiple machines on the floor at the same time (some carded / some not) and some were even from the previous day.</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	"Recently there was an examplea player came in and basically bill stuffed machines across the property over 3 or 4 hours to the value of about \$40,000. Every 30 minutes or so he would press collect and the ticketing systemwould spit out a ticket from the machine which would then require a cheque to be issued because anything over \$2,000 must be paid by cheque. This guyended up with something like nine gaming chequesour department reconciles / issues all the gaming chequesrea standoutone patron across such a small period of time, ranging from values of \$2,000 up to \$10,000they can go in and see what actual activity there was on those individual machinesthey become unverified chequesreporting done to our AML team along the lines of a UARpotentially to patron will be "WOLd"."  "Bill stuffing, putting in note after note after noteupon investigation it was seen that the amount of money that was inserted in cash was the amount of money that was collectedexample of inserting notes, collecting the ticket, rinse and repeat."  "Ticket just has the value, date, expiry dateinvestigation has to be a proactive approach in this instanceit was reported to a more recent manager who didn't have a bunch of investigation experience — I remember this because I was with her —we found4 tickets where there were instance of bill stuffingthen the collection happenedso after that, that was when we lodged an unusual activity report."  "When you put them through the machine and white dust is coming off them." "153 "It's dirty it's mainly grubby money it's really hard to count it's mouldy"	
		d ML incidents and it appears that the nature of om the fact that there has been a reduced number

153 It is unclear whether this comment was made in jest; the next comment was made by a colleagues immediately suggesting that the first scenarios was potentially an exaggeration.

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
AML Awareness Training (frequency and effectiveness)	<ul> <li>AML training is delivered on induction for all departments (runs for around 10 minutes) and then periodically.</li> <li>'Crown Learn' (online training created by Crown) is completed annually where staff members have to pass a knowledge check test at the conclusion of the module. If the staff member does not successfully complete the knowledge check at the end of the online course, they are required to keep trying until they pass (there is no remedial training option).</li> <li>Participants from the EGM<sup>154</sup> division indicated that they receive briefings before their shift a few times a year where they would receive reminders to look out for certain behaviours.</li> <li>More face-to-face training was held pre-COVID-19 (face-to-face training has been reduced due to the COVID-19 response).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>AML training is delivered face-to-face on induction for all departments (runs for around 10 minutes) and then periodically (as for previous state).</li> <li>During induction, staff are shown a short video provided by AUSTRAC that explains ML, and also go through common ML typologies that run through a casino – they will try to align the AML training with their role.</li> <li>Crown Learn (online training created by Crown) is completed annually where staff members have to pass a knowledge check test at the conclusion (as for previous state).</li> <li>Face-to-face training has been held post-lockdown (operations manager presenting to gaming machines staff).</li> <li>Managers currently undertake a full training day.</li> <li>Standard Operating Procedures were rewritten (and include AML specific sections) and are being rolled-out to all departments.</li> <li>Some participants indicated that the same amount of AML training has been conducted recently as compared to previously, and that they haven't had face-to-face training since COVID-19.</li> <li>Some participants indicated that they complete quite a bit of online training.</li> <li>The surveillance team undertakes comprehensive training to understand their reporting obligations.</li> <li>Electronic Gaming Machine department participants indicated that they now have briefings at the beginning of every shift where they receive reminders to look out for certain behaviours.</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	a lot of responsibility in our space as wellwe do a	that our responsibilities are and what to look out ession because we oversee other areas and we have bit more an involved training just for people to if we don't save footage for a particular incident and
	did prior to COVID-19, the general consensus of and there has been a heavier focus on AML sirtle It was noted that the AML team have been run units, including how to use the new AML Portal	ning AML training specific to different business

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> EGM – Electronic Gaming Machine

Theme	Focus Group Observations  Previous state	Focus Group Observations  Current state
AML Culture (OTF)	<ul> <li>A common theme was participants believing that they were already compliant with AML requirements.</li> <li>Some participants indicated that in the past, large amounts of cash such as \$25,000 to \$100,000 would not attract the same level of scrutiny unless staff actually suspected something suspicious.</li> <li>AML participants noted that floor staff were always trained to complete SMRs<sup>155</sup> when they had a suspicion. In the past SMRs were completed in circumstances where a UAR is now completed – UARs are reviewed by the AML team and an SMR is raised by the AML team if thought appropriate and then forwarded to AUSTRAC.</li> <li>Some participants suggested that the frequency and incidence of ML in the casino is overstated, and that there wouldn't be as much illegal money passing through the casino as people would think, since all the floor staff are watching and have had the training.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Participants indicated that there is more accountability regarding AML and that the culture has improved in relation to AML.</li> <li>Participants suggested that there will be a culture shift going forward because AML is a heavy focus for new staff.</li> <li>They noted that there is a heavy focus on AML now and resourcing for compliance roles has increased.</li> <li>They also suggested that the changes could be maintained by upholding the procedures that are in place now, for example the "Observation sheet" on the floor.</li> <li>Some participants believe that they are very compliant and have high levels of integrity, and they take offence to what is being said in the media.</li> <li>Some participants have noted that the increased scrutiny and media attention has made their jobs easier in some areas due to increased numbers of resources in the team and cooperation by Crown staff, as well as increased training.</li> <li>Participants suggested that the change in culture has been driven by senior management wanting to keep the casino licence, so the culture really seems to be changing.</li> <li>Participants indicated that they have been more cautious and it is more common now for staff to say 'no' to patrons.</li> <li>The obligation for collecting customer information has been pushed onto the departments, so there has become a heavier obligation (imposed by management) for floor staff to collect information for the AML team to use.</li> </ul>

 $<sup>^{155}</sup>$  SMR – Suspicious Matter Report

# Focus group illustrative comments

- "If we suspect it, we report it...we can't stop it, we're not the police."
- "The culture's good, people are...! don't think any different to the way they were before.
- "Our team completely understand what's involved and why it's needed and why it's so important, we always have."
- Especially known players...we know that this person comes in with \$100,000 every week...we know him, he owns a business...that's not suspect."
- "But if someone out of the blue, someone we didn't know, no history or anything, just plonked down \$100,000 in cash then obviously it's going to raise suspicions."
- "The reality is we got SMRs from the floor and never would have suggested to anyone not to report a suspicion."
- "It's just this sensationalised idea that all this illegal money is funnelling through the casino...the employees stand there and we get trained almost daily and get spoken to...regularly about financial crimes...it's damn hard to do it [i.e. launder money] in a casino."

- "I think it's a bit more stringent and there's a bit more accountability and that's a good thing."
- "100% there has been a culture shift".
- "There's a massive focus on it now. And resourcing for the actual policing of compliance and maintaining compliance integrity...it's been massive, there's been so many jobs going... for 'this officer' and 'this officer'...it's a massive shift."
- "My area's very compliant...we take offense to some of the stuff that's out there about AML, because we're looking at it day-in-day-out, submitting previously SMRs...we're continually looking at things to make sure that they're done by the book."
- "We pride ourselves on upholding the highest level of integrity in what we do and we want to make sure that everything is done right."
- "The people within the business are amazing...seeing some of the guys on the Board answer some of those questions, it was out of control I was in disbelief and it reflected terribly on the people, the real people of Crown...the people working for Crown were doing their best."
- "This awareness and the raising of it just makes it a little bit easier for us to get people to comply with what we want, you know, no junkets..."
- "The AML team...through some of the trainings that they've done, they've given us further insight that we might not have had."
- "We'll actually be volunteered the information without having to cause much fuss."
- "Now we've been trained so much and we've had all this training, so our jobs are on the line if something happens, so a 'no' is a very common thing."
- "Everything keeps changing as the inquiry goes on... so yes, a lot of angry people...very unhappy [customers].
- "We're dealing with dodgy people all day every day."

Theme	Focus Group Observations Previous state	Focus Group Observations  Current state
		"Each department have their own gaming integrity crew now which didn't exactly exist."
		"There is no doubt that there's been a push back to the departmentsto make sure that they look at these obligations more strongly, so each of the departments, whether it's gaming machines or table games or Cagehave to look at their customersthey have to look at their more predominant players, usually it's their higher-tier customers, but there is a push to know their customer and they keep records of whatever information they can put together, of which the AML team can use."
	<ul> <li>were always encouraged to report suspicious</li> <li>This was in contrast to other staff who said the</li> </ul>	
AML Culture (other than OTF)	The culture within the AML resources was always good – it was a question of resourcing rather than culture.	<ul> <li>AML team participants indicated that they have never been aware of staff being told not to submit an SMR, but there is no doubt there has been a bigger push and educational process since the Bergin Inquiry.</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	suspicious matter report if they believed it to be s	en aware of where we would tell staff not to submit a suspicious, however I guess simply you come back here's been a heavier push, education processend of SMRs that are submitted."
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that AML / Compliance staff b good and will improve due to increased	elieve that the culture around AML was always resourcing.
Resourcing (AML Team)	<ul> <li>AML team participants indicated that previously AML resourcing was inadequate but the company believed that they were - it was difficult to get additional AML resources (previously there were about six staff dedicated to AML).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The AML team has increased significantly recently and it is planned to rise to a total of around 50 AML dedicated personnel (Melbourne, Perth and Sydney combined).</li> </ul>

Theme	Focus Group Observations Previous state	Focus Group Observations  Current state		
Focus group illustrative comments	<ul> <li>"Logicallythe numbers weren't appropriate, but the company believed they were, obviously, and whether that's dollar-driven or not, it's for others to also answer, but getting resources has not always been a simple answer in most departments."</li> <li>"It was clear that things were changing byNick Stokesthere was a push to obviously review what AML were doing."</li> <li>"Perhaps that's the way the company was headingthere would have been change."</li> </ul>			
	<ul> <li>McGrathNicol observation:</li> <li>It appears that the employees acknowledged that the AML team numbers were inappropriate (in hindsight) and Crown was already starting to increase their AML focus prior to the Bergin Inquiry (particularly once Louise Lane started at Crown), however it appears that the Bergin Inquiry expedited Crown's plans to grow their AML team because it became necessary to keep their licence.</li> </ul>			
AML Team function (effectiveness)	<ul> <li>The different locations were run independently but they liaised with each other.</li> <li>The Bergin Report criticised the AML team's bank statement review process however the AML team noted that they had always reviewed the bank statements, just apparently not in the manner that they should have.</li> <li>The AML team missed the aggregated entries, and suggested that some staff missed them perhaps due to lack of training.</li> <li>Less AML policies were in place, for example third party transactions were acceptable since the relationships were often known (or otherwise it may have led to an SMR) and there were also business reasons for accepting deposits from business / trust accounts.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The AML team function has merged and people in the AML team commonly work across the two locations (Melbourne and Perth as well as Sydney when that commences operation).</li> <li>The AML team's role is to follow the AML program, which involves reporting obligations (i.e. TTRs, SMRs, IFTIs, etc.) and educational obligations such as making sure that all relevant staff are aware of their obligations regarding AML and know who to pass relevant information on to.</li> <li>The increase in resources is enabling the AML team to be more effective.</li> <li>Reports on TTRs are run each day. 100-150 TTRs are typically reported each day (or 320-350 on weekends) during usual operating conditions.</li> <li>New AML policies have been introduced such as no longer accepting cash deposits into DAB accounts.</li> </ul>		
Focus group illustrative comments	"The programs prior to the Joint Program weren't dissimilar they were fairly well-aligned."			
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that the AML team has become increased and the Joint AML/CTF Program			

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
Communication of AML Policies and Procedures	• N/A	<ul> <li>Participants indicated that the communication of AML Policies and Procedures has been effective, and it occurs via:         <ul> <li>Emails</li> <li>Being informed by managers on the floor</li> <li>Memorandums posted on Crown intranet</li> <li>Weekly updates about changed policies / procedure</li> <li>Weekly email from Crown Chair regarding changes (previously did not happen)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that there has been good com	munication of AML policies and procedures.
AML Conduct by OTF personnel	<ul> <li>There were less limits to force staff to document transactions and a customer's source of wealth which could indicate ML.</li> <li>Previously, a customer could bring in large amounts of cash and gamble without completing a SOW declaration, however an SMR may still have been completed, in addition to a TTR.</li> <li>Previously only 1-2 or up to 8 SMRs submitted per day.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>More limits have been imposed to detect indicators of ML, such as the requirement for a SOF form to be completed, where the threshold was originally \$100,000 (cumulative in a particular day), then became \$50,000 and recently became \$25,000. Participants indicated that the policy came into effect in November 2020.</li> <li>Participants noted that the SOF process is robust and happens "all the time".</li> <li>The decision after the customer completes the source of funds form gets made within 10-15 minutes after talking to them about what they've written down. Phone calls are also made to other floor staff to corroborate what the customer has said, discussions are had between floor staff and floor managers.</li> <li>The general policy when a customer's SOF is rejected is that they are escorted from the premises.</li> <li>Participants indicated that TTRs are completed at the table and they are easy to do, therefore not disruptive to play – the dealer asks the player for their member card or ID (if they don't have a member card) and determines whether they are confident that the person is who they say they are (same as previous). If they were to swipe the customer's card and it isn't them, they would do a UAR.</li> <li>Participants indicated that most patrons in the VIP rooms are compliant.</li> <li>Cage staff noted that not as many people have been coming in with large amounts of cash recently, also since there is more scrutiny on people who bring in large amounts of cash.</li> <li>Usually about 20 UARs submitted per day.</li> </ul>

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
Focus group illustrative comments	"Before, we didn't have limitswe would be keeping an eye on it ourselves and then obviously there would be an investigation when the amount got crazybut now we have the source of funds" "Players bringing in \$150,000and then they would always get a suspect transaction done on them." "Often there would be suspect transaction reportssubmitted to the AML groupobviously we would report any suspicions we had and Scott would forward it onto AUSTRAC." "Also, we would monitor if that money was actually used for gamingfrom there they may have been another report to AML." "They must have category A ID that's valid, there would have been a threshold transactionwe still looked at people that we consideredto be a suspicious matter with large amounts of cash"	"Since the Bergin Inquiry we've now gone to having a policy where they must actually declare where the money's fromabove a certain thresholdand I would say probably 2 out of every 3 are probably rejected."  "They might say, 'I got it from selling Bitcoin."  "They'll say, 'I got it off a friend."  "People don't want to come in because of everything that's going on."
Observation of improper customer / OTF personnel relationship	<ul> <li>Previously in the Mahogany room, customers could request a particular dealer (if they were Black Card members). There was an example of a customer colluding with a dealer which was picked up by surveillance. The customer was escorted from the premises by police and the dealer was terminated.</li> </ul>	ransactions totalling more than \$25,000 in a tion and SOW details would only be reported if they icious.  It is no longer permitted for customers to request a particular dealer unless they obtain approval from the ACM (Assistant Casino Manager).  If an area manager notices a patron following a particular dealer, they alert surveillance by giving them a phone call and providing
	<ul> <li>There has been data analysis (and this continues to be the case) to identify certain dealers that are responsible for losing more money at the tables (compared to the parameters, which trigger alerts to watch the dealer at the table).</li> <li>Improper customer / OTF personnel conduct has been flagged by other patrons in the past.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>details of the areas to watch.</li> <li>A dealer might leave someone's losing bets on the table rather than take them, however if it happens more than once it would probably be noticed (particularly by another patron) and investigated.</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	<ul> <li>"They're not being involved so they dob in other patrons."</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"Say a dealer is friends with a patron he won't take his losing bets."</li> </ul>
		ng groomed by patrons have decreased since the to request a particular dealer without approval from

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
Avenues for reporting AML concerns (OTF personnel)	SMRs were submitted to AUSTRAC. The AML team did not have discretion over whether it was submitted to AUSTRAC or not – if an employee thought that the matter was suspicious, it was submitted to AUSTRAC. Previously only 1-2 or up to 8 SMRs submitted per day.	<ul> <li>UARs are to be completed using the computers on the floor when staff notice suspicious activity. Participants indicated that the computers are hidden but easily accessible. Some UARs are received directly from the surveillance team.</li> <li>UARs are investigated by the AML team which includes review of open source information (e.g. Dow Jones checks), and the AML team submits SMRs to AUSTRAC if they determine (upon investigation) that something suspicious has occurred.</li> <li>Participants indicated that the UAR process is timely.</li> <li>Everyone who sees the suspicious activity is responsible for submitting UARs (i.e. Cage staff, area managers, surveillance) and sometimes numerous UARs will be completed for one incident.</li> <li>Surveillance will be called to provide a picture of the customer. The staff completing the UAR will insert the footage reference number provided by surveillance.</li> <li>The area manager will complete a UAR once the dealer has alerted them to the suspicious activity – there are usually 5-6 area managers to 12 tables, and if activity is high then there is usually 1 area manager to 1 dealer. The amount of area managers on duty is based on the amount of risk (there may be up to 2-3 area managers on one table in the international VIP areas).</li> <li>If the area manager needs more information to complete the UAR, they will ask the patron for more details, therefore the patron is aware that they have been reported on.</li> <li>The assistant casino manager will also be notified so that the customer is on the radar before a UAR is submitted.</li> <li>The number of UARs has increased, compared to SMRs (previously).</li> </ul>
Focus group illustrative comments	"It's not like it was hard." "People had the training."	"There was a significant increase in UARs now for a number of reasonsthere is a whole different system nowthere's a bigger buy-in from all departmentsand clearly the numbers of UARs now are much stronger now than they would have been."
	previously) due to the new, user-friendly AML  All employees were very familiar with the UAR	now are much stronger now than they would ha

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations	
	Previous state	Current state	
AML Risk Level	<ul> <li>Without controls, AML risk is 'high' – with the controls that are in place, the risk is reduced. Residual risk level (after controls taken into account) is categorised as 'low'.</li> <li>When asked about their opinion on the Risk Level, staff noted that they have made mistakes in the past.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Participants suggested that the AML risk level has decreased.</li> </ul>	
Focus group illustrative comments	Logically we're going to do that I wouldn't put all these things in place and say that it's high risk." "It is clear that we've made mistakesI'm just saying that we didn't deliberately mean to do those things."	"What Crown is doing now surely you'd sit them and go 'we are more comfortable to say that we're on low risk" because we're putting more things in place, we're jumping through more hoops than we've ever jumped through to appease the GodsCrown will do anything to ensure we keep our licence."  "With everything they're currently doing, if we're not in a better spot well then we're clearly stupid people."	
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that the AML risk level has decrease procedures.	d since the introduction of new AML policies and	
Technical functionality	Manual transaction monitoring processes only.	<ul> <li>Facial recognition technology has improved and is capable of identifying banned customers and identifying the identity of a customer from previous activity.</li> <li>Currently working between both manual and automatic transaction monitoring, via Sentinel. Participants indicated that manual reporting will be phased out. Participants noted that Sentinel currently has no artificial intelligence capability.</li> </ul>	
Focus group illustrative comments	"We've got fantastic images at all the entry points andall the outer points so that we're alerted to people before they actually approach the entries, we've got plenty of timethose photos are obtained from those cameras which are really high definition."		
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that Crown has extensive surveillance systems which assist the AML team, including a high definition facial recognition system which even has the ability to recognise people wearing disguises.  It also appears that transaction monitoring has become more effective since the introduction of Sentinel.		
Know Your Customer Protocols	<ul> <li>Identification is sometimes required to verify age on entry</li> <li>Rewards card is required to enter VIP areas</li> <li>Identification is required in order to process cheque payment</li> <li>Identification required in relation to transactions above \$10,000 (for TTR)</li> <li>Currently no access to government database to verify customers' passports and driver's licences</li> </ul>	On 1 May 2021, a new policy was implemented requiring ID to be presented to re-issue Rewards cards every six months – ID produced has to be issued by a Government Department (e.g. drivers' licence)	

Theme	Focus Group Observations	Focus Group Observations
	Previous state	Current state
Focus group illustrative comments	"There is no doubt that there's been a push-back to these obligations more strongly, so each of the deposition of the de	artments, whether it's gaming machines or table ey have to look at their more predominant players, a push to know their customer and they keep her, of which the AML team can use."  Is easy to approach themif you build the enths on the first of October and on the first of
	McGrathNicol observation:  It appears that the AML team has placed greate information on customers.	er pressure on the individual departments to collec

## APPENDIX H Focus Group money laundering scenario analysis

#### **On-the-floor Focus Group Scenario Analysis**

#### Scenario

A croupier is operating a Baccarat table on the main gaming floor. A supervisor is overseeing the croupier's table and there are security personnel patrolling the immediate area. A player appears at the table and tenders around \$5,000 in bank notes which the croupier counts and exchanges for chips.

The player does not tender a Crown Rewards Card. The player plays every second or third game for 90 minutes only winning once.

The croupier notices the player seems to be quite disinterested in the game. He moves to the next Baccarat table for 30 minutes before leaving the gaming floor with what the croupier estimates would be 90% of the original chips he had purchased at her table.

- It was determined by the focus group that this is a realistic scenario and has occurred in the past.
- If this behaviour is noticed by staff the common practice is to notify the area manager of what is happening. The outcome of this scenario depends on how the area manager responds to the report made to them (i.e. the croupier would not by themselves submit a UAR, it would be done in conjunction with the area manager).
- When a patron attends a gaming table the croupier will always ask for a Crown Rewards Card some customers will provide their
  rewards card while others will not (even if they have a rewards card) for a variety of legitimate reasons (e.g. they feel it is unlucky).
- Whether facts in this scenario are suspicious behaviour is based on the croupier's discretion of what is occurring and how the patron
  is acting.
- It is common that 'carded patrons' (those who hold a Crown Rewards Card) are attempting to earn crown reward points without actually gaming (i.e. just by spending time at the table). In this instance, the area manager is able to adjust that patron's 'rate of play' down in the system due to them not gaming.
- The area manager would be the person who changes rate of play (ATOM) as the croupier is seated at the table and cannot stand up as this would take their attention away from table play (at certain games).
- If the patron complains that they did not earn as many points as they would have expected, the croupier / area manager would inform them that their rate has been adjusted due to lack of play.
- The focus group noted that floor staff are vigilant in observing this behaviour.
- The SOF / SOW requirements and thresholds have added extra controls to the Casino floor (currently a SOF form will be required where a customer attempts to buy-in more than \$25,000 in a single transaction or more than \$25,000 in a single calendar day where each transaction is at least \$10,000 and would therefore require a TTR to be completed).
- Currently around two out of three SOF forms are rejected by cage cashiers as they don't satisfy the requirements e.g. 'given money
  by a friend' or 'bank loan' in which case the buy-in transaction is not completed.

Three male customers enter the main floor via the same entrance but a few minutes apart. They relocate to an area in front of a Cage. Each one goes to a different Cage window at different times and appears to purchase chips with cash. They then appear to rendezvous at the place where they first met after arriving on the main floor.

All three then go to different table games on the main floor (one to Blackjack, one to Baccarat and one to Pontoon Pandemonium) where they play for around an hour.

They then meet up again near their original meeting place with two of the customers appearing to hand something to the third. The third customer then goes by himself to a Cage different to the Cage where he had purchased the chips originally. He presents a large quantity of chips he is holding and it appears that he receives a cheque for the value of the chips tendered.

- In this scenario, surveillance would be focused on determining how the individual obtained those funds / chips.
- The focus group did not consider this type of behaviour to be common.
- The participants noted that on the main gaming floor you must get your chips at the table rather than the cage (it is not possible to purchase chips at the main gaming floor cages although this is possible in the VIP lounges due to the larger values of chips to be purchased which would take too long if processed by a croupier)
- Surveillance would work backwards following the individual to determine his gaming activity and back to where the patron was with the other individuals.
- If anyone requests a cheque of 'significant value' without verified or carded play the cashier / cage manager will attempt to
  determine the validity of the chips / winnings via contacting surveillance or the area manager where the patron claims to have
  played.
- If the cage cannot verify the gaming activity or source of chips, they will issue an unverified gaming cheque. They must provide the patron with a cheque. The patron is not made aware that the cheque is unverified. An unverifiable cheque notes that the cheque has been provided by Crown but that Crown has not been able to verify gaming activity that has taken place.
- Surveillance noted it is not possible to use facial recognition to detect where someone has played during a gaming session, they
  would need to review the footage.
- In this instance and similar scenarios, notes and comments will be made in SYCO against that patrons account (if carded play).
- In this scenario, individuals will buy-in at the table. The cage does not provide chips unless a threshold transaction may be required.
- If the scenario is noted as suspicious the cashier will notify the cage manager, the cage manager will contact surveillance to ensure they have a photo of the patron recorded and a file started with a PID issued (if the patron is not carded if the patron is carded, the Crown Rewards Card number will be used to identify the patron).

Two male customers arrive at a table in the roulette area each with a substantial quantity of pre-purchased chips – they are not talking with each other but it is clear from their body language as they approach the table that they are together. Both offer their Crown Rewards Card which the croupier swipes.

The supervisor observes that they go to opposite ends of one of the Roulette tables under his supervision. The table they are at is moderately crowded with around 12 players. There is a distinctive pattern of play involving the two players.

While each player makes small straight up bets, on every play:

- One player will bet on red and the other will bet on black; or
- One player will bet on evens and the other will bet on odds.

Player 1 always bets first followed by player 2. After an hour of play, both players leave the roulette tables with their respective holding of chips having had their Crown Rewards Card swiped by the croupier.

- It was noted that this behaviour is more likely to occur on eTGs than at traditional table games as presented in the scenario, but it is
  possible and has occurred in the past.
- It is likely that this would come under scrutiny when the individuals cash out at the cage (dependent on value).
- It was noted that this would require considerable effort to launder a substantial amount of money and if significant funds were being used on the main gaming floor this would be noticed by the croupier and area manager.
- In this instance due to the patrons providing a Rewards Card, their play would be tracked and verified at cash-out.
- Focus group participants noted that patrons often become complacent; they may not be caught the first time but may be caught if
  they repeat the same behaviour.
- Focus group participants noted that it is not uncommon for patrons with a Rewards Card not use them for a variety of reasons –
  patrons may be superstitious that using a members card is unlucky or they simply prefer their gaming activity not to be known.

#### Scenario 4

A security officer is on duty on the main floor. She notices a customer seated at an eTG but that he seems to be very distracted and constantly looking around.

His play is very slow compared to other customers and he does not appear to be interested in the game. After 40 minutes, the security officer notices the customer approach another player at a nearby eTG.

There is a conversation that goes for about five minutes, the first player appears to take two or three casino chips out of his pocket and hands them to the other player who gives a piece of paper in exchange.

The first player then wanders the floor for about ten minutes without playing before he approaches a Cage and completes a transaction with the Cage operator.

- The focus group noted that initially they would perceive the patron is waiting for their friend to arrive at the casino.
- It was noted that chips are possibly split because one of the patrons may be banned and would not be able to transact at the Cage.
- If the Cage became suspicious about the activity that was occurring they would contact surveillance to track the play and determine
  who the chips or tickets actually belonged to.
- In this instance it was determined there would be enough suspicion to lodge a UAR.
- Focus group participants noted they may also require further investigation e.g. through surveillance or by looking at the eGM's
  transaction history (since the ticket would specify the machine and the time that it was obtained) to determine if the scenario was in
  fact suspicious.
- The focus group agreed that if all patrons were required to use an ID for every transaction or gaming activity the risk of money laundering would be reduced; but argue there is a commercial decision to be made and can't force every patron to become a member, especially for casual gaming (e.g. after football).
- The focus group also noted that the level of play and level of money on the main gaming floor is much lower and therefore less
  risky in VIP areas, all patrons require a member card to gain access and are identified on entry.

A cashier is at work at one of the Cages on the main floor. A customer presents at the Cage window with a bag of cash in bundles which she places on the counter in front of the cashier.

The cashier forms a view that there is more than \$10,000 and asks the customer for identification in order to complete a TTR (Threshold Transaction Report).

The customer asks why this is necessary and when told that Crown needs to make a report to AUSTRAC, she replies "I don't have any ID with me". She then takes back half of the cash and says she wants to buy a lesser quantity of chips.

- The focus group noted that the scenario would rarely occur in this manner.
- It is likely it would occur the other way around when the individual approaches the cage in order to cash out the cashier would
  check for rated play. If the patron did have a Rewards card, the Cage would be able to check if rated play had occurred.
- If the patron did not have a Rewards card, depending on the value, the cashier / cage operations manager would attempt to verify play via contacting surveillance or the area manager where the patron claims to have played.
- If the patron refuses to provide identification, this is automatically suspicious, surveillance would be notified and a UAR would be completed.
- In the past, the Cage would be able to issue patrons with CEV's (Chip Exchange Vouchers) for cash tendered. Once presented at a
  table for chips the croupier would identify the individual. This process does not occur anymore. The transaction must occur through
  the individual's DAB account.

## Scenario 6

A customer enters the main gaming floor carrying a supermarket shopping bag which he holds close to his chest. He then takes up a position at an eTG and spends the next 20 minutes feeding notes into the terminal.

He then raises a TITO ticket and makes his way to a Cage. It does not appear that the customer has actually placed a bet.

- eTG staff are made aware that bill stuffing and refining is a red flag and suspicious behaviour within eTGs.
- If the TITO amount is below \$2,000 the individual could cash out at the automated ticket redemption terminals (TRTs).
- If the TITO amount is above \$2,000 they must cash out at the Cage.
- The cashier would attempt to verify play through the patron's Rewards card, if they are not a member they may contact the eTG area manager to determine if play occurred and also contact surveillance to track the patron's movements and determine if they actually played on the eTG.
- The TITO also enables the staff to identify what machine it came from and where the patron played.
- Patrons are able to use the TRTs to break larger bill denominations into smaller denominations but not from smaller into larger denominations e.g. \$20s into \$100s.
- Staff are also able to view the last 50 games that occurred on each gaming machine. If required, staff could check the patron's
  machine to see if gaming has occurred, or only cash in and TITO out.
- If the patron attempted to cash out with multiple TITO tickets this is also a red flag.
- A UAR would be lodged in this scenario.
- It was noted that it takes a considerable amount of time to conduct bill stuffing, approximately an hour to insert \$10,000 worth of notes into an eTG.

A cashier is working in a Cage on the main floor. He notices a male customer approach one of the other cashiers and tenders what appears to be \$4,000 to \$5,000 in \$10, \$20 and \$50 denominations. The cashier the customer approaches is notable because there are already two customers waiting to be served while there are other cashiers that are free. It appears that the customer deposits this cash to his Crown member card.

The cashier has seen this customer appear at Crown on several occasions over the previous six months and each time he walks out of the gaming floor having deposited funds to his Crown membership card without going to a gaming table.

On this occasion, the cashier notices the customer is wearing a corporate shirt marked "The Refuge Café" and the name "Simon". The cashier speaks to the cashier who processed the transaction and asks whether he is going to complete a UAR. The other cashier responds "Why should I?"

- The focus group weren't entirely sure what was happening in this scenario and the reason that patrons would be conducting this
  activity.
- The focus group noted that the patron could probably get away with it if he was withdrawing small amounts of cash.
- They noted that DAB accounts become inactive after a certain period of time and are reviewed.
- The focus group noted that safekeeping accounts were utilised in the past; these are not for gaming activity, more so a line of credit
  or to cover bills or front money for poker games.
- The focus group noted that there have been instances where patrons prefer to use crowns accounts because they 'do not trust banks'.
- The focus group also noted that Crown would be a good place to hold funds because there are no holding charges (i.e. bank fees).
- In this instance, the focus group noted in this situation, one cashier would not speak with the other cashier, they would notify the cage manager.
- The focus group noted that nowadays a UAR would be completed, prior to the UAR portal the SMR's were a lot more cumbersome
  and potentially (three or so years ago) would not have been completed based on this scenario.
- The focus group noticed there has been a change in culture regarding reporting and completing UARs. Employees are more than happy to call out bad behaviour; they also have multiple ways they can do this. If the behaviour involves another employee they may report to HR or utilise the whistleblower hotline.
- In this instance just one person would complete the UAR, not both cashiers.

The CCTV surveillance team is monitoring activity in the Roulette area of the Mahogany Room.

One of the surveillance operators observes a customer arriving at a roulette table is carrying a large quantity of cash that appear to be in a mix of \$50 and \$20 denominations.

The customer removes a bundle of notes without counting them (retaining the remainder of the bundle of notes) and hands them to the croupier who exchanges the cash for around \$6,000 in chips.

The customer plays the next two games at the table before getting up and moving on to another roulette table where the same pattern occurs.

- The focus group identified that this behaviour is attempting to avoid a threshold transaction.
- Surveillance noted it may be indicative of money laundering and would be suspicious in the Mahogany room as most players are
  usually using \$100 notes.
- The focus group noted that the area manager would monitor how often the patron does it and would call surveillance.
- If the matter became more serious the SIU (Security Investigations Unit) would become involved.
- The focus group noted that they are unable to stop this behaviour at the time only option is to report it.
- The focus group noted that as the patron is gaming within the Mahogany room, they must have a member card and therefore
  would be known to the casino.
- The focus group noted that buying-in at a table and walking to another table is an automatic trigger as suspicious behaviour.
- If surveillance noted this type of behaviour they keep it within the department, create a file and monitor the behaviour. The
  surveillance team do not contact the floor or have the patron approached as they will want to gather further evidence.
- The focus group noted that, while money laundering will happen in the Casino, whether it will be picked-up or noted as suspicious by employees will depend on the value of the transactions concerned e.g. a group of people gambling on different tables for around \$2,000 could be done and not noticed.
- In this instance all focus group participants would lodge a UAR.

#### Scenario 9

A cashier is operating in a Cage in the Teak Room. At 4.00 pm she is approached by a customer who exchanges \$2,000 cash for chips of various denominations and offers his Crown Rewards Card to record the transaction. She watches as the customer heads for the gaming tables.

At 7.30 pm, the same customer returns to the same cashier and tenders \$7,800 in chips and instructs the cashier to raise a cheque for his "winnings". He makes vague comments throughout the transaction about being "lucky tonight!"

Would the situation be different if the customer came back with \$15,000 at 5.00 pm?

- It was noted that this scenario is feasible.
- In this scenario the focus group participants noted that they would check the player ratings from the membership card to ensure the winnings make sense.
- The same action would be taken for either amounts of money, it all depends on the rated play that is evident on that member's card.
- If there was no rated play noted on the members card the patron would be asked questions about where they have been gaming
  contact the area manager. If the scenario was still suspicious at this point a UAR would be raised the customer would still be
  paid out their winnings regardless.
- If the patron is cashing out for a cheque they are required to provide ID. Regardless if they have signed up as a member they are
  essentially entered into the system at that point in time.
- Focus group participants noted a lot of emphasis is put on knowing the patron and their typical gaming behaviour and patterns.

Two customers enter the main gaming floor together. A security officer sees one customer give a Crown Rewards Card to the other customer. The second customer attends a cashier and completes a transaction using the member card provided by the first customer.

It appears that the transaction is the purchase of chips using the member card.

- The focus group noted that this would be considered as a misuse of membership cards.
- The focus group noted that this is much more likely to occur on EGMs. A patron may be attempting to gain points from another patron's play.
- The focus group noted that when a member's card is swiped at the Cage or entrance the patron's information and ID shows up and so it would be clear that the patron was not presenting their own card.
- If this was noted at the time a discussion would be held with the patron, the card may be confiscated, notes would be made on both players' card file and it may be escalated from that point.
- This may cause the patron to be banned if it was ongoing behaviour.
- The patron may also be listed as a Teak or Mahogany 'undesirable'.

## Scenario 11

A cashier is on duty in a Cage in the Mahogany Room. A customer who has been in the Mahogany Room for several hours arrives at the Cage with around \$25,000 in chips

He presents three member cards and asks if he could have \$9,000 of his 'winnings' credited to each of two membership cards and for the remainder to be credited to the third.

The cashier notices that the three member cards are in different names and starts to query way he is presenting member cards in different names.

The customer becomes angry and says forcefully that he is there with two friends who have gone to have dinner and that they are good customers of the Mahogany Room.

- The focus group noted that it is not permitted to transact on another patron's membership card.
- The focus group noted this is not a very realistic scenario.
- It was noted that a PIN is required to deposit cash or winnings onto a Rewards card and that few patrons utilise their Crown Rewards cards as stored value accounts.
- It was also noted that patrons are not able to credit somebody's account without providing a signature and ID.
- In this scenario, the patron would be advised to have his friends come and transact on their own membership cards / accounts.
- Patrons are also more aware of transaction levels and changes in processes at Crown based on information from Crown staff / VIP Services and what is noted in the media.

#### **AML Second Line Focus Group Scenario Analysis**

## Scenario 3

Two male customers arrive at a roulette table in the main gaming floor each with a substantial quantity of pre-purchased chips.

They are not talking with each other but it is clear from their body language as they approach the table that they are together. Both offer their Crown Rewards Card which the croupier swipes. The Area Manager observes that they go to opposite ends of the table.

The table they are at is moderately crowded with around 12 players. There is a distinctive pattern of play involving the two players.

While each player makes small straight up bets, on every play:

- One player will bet on red and the other will bet on black; or
- One player will bet on evens and the other will bet on odds.

Player 1 always bets first followed by player 2. After an hour, both players leave the roulette tables with their respective holding of chips having had their Crown Rewards Card swiped by the croupier. The Area Manager submits a UAR in the AML Portal.

- Focus group participants noted that the croupier would notify the area manager of this behaviour.
- The area manager is covering too many tables to notice this by themselves.
- It was noted that it would be rare for large amounts to be placed on even money bets (red/black odds/evens) consistently.
- In this scenario the croupier would page the area manager (discretely) who would use the UAR portal and submit a UAR through to the AML team.
- The AML team would review the detail within the UAR, contact surveillance who would likely submit their own UAR for the same scenario if notified by the area manager.
- The AML team would match up the patron name and number, conduct Dow Jones searching, search through SEER for facial recognition if the patron was not carded and determine whether any unusual activity had been lodged prior.
- It is likely in this scenario the area manager would inform the assistant casino manager so they could keep an eye on the patron's activity as well as notifying surveillance.
- Currently UAR's are triaged based on the risk of the activity. Previously they were reviewed on a chronological basis. If the UARs are
  above approximately \$20,000 they are high risk or if the AML team receive requests from VicPol or AFP these are high risk.
- If a UAR includes gaming activity less than \$10,000 this is considered 'low risk'.
- PEPs and RCAs are high risk UARs.
- Every UAR must have a rationale for action taken (to proceed to an SMR or to close the file). The UAR is input into 'CURA' and a profile is created for that patron this enables the AML team to check if prior UAR's have been raised on the same patron.
- The focus group noted this scenario is unlikely to be picked-up on the main floor. 12 people around a baccarat table is too many for the dealer to identify all of them, also the monetary value (and return on investment) is very low.
- One focus group member suggested this scenario was more likely an attempt to gain member points rather than money laundering.
- Focus group participants noted that patrons would conduct this activity on eTGs as it would be less likely to be picked-up.
   Engaging in even money betting would not require two patrons to be working in collusion, it would be possible for one person to do it at a single eTG terminal.

A cashier is at work at one of the Cages on the main floor. A customer presents at the Cage window with a bag of cash in bundles which she places on the counter in front of the cashier.

The cashier forms a view that there is more than \$10,000 and asks the customer for identification in order to complete a TTR (Threshold Transaction Report).

The customer asks why this is necessary and when told that Crown needs to make a report to AUSTRAC, she replies "I don't have any ID with me".

She then takes back half of the cash and says she wants to buy a lesser quantity of chips. The cashier submits a UAR in the AML Portal.

- The focus group participants noted that this happens 'most days'.
- It was noted that sometimes (in practice) a customer might only ask to take off \$100.
- It is correct for a UAR to be reported based on this scenario.
- · Participants noted that a UAR would be made, not due to the monetary value but due to the high-risk nature of the activity.
- It was noted that the customer's history would also be taken into account, for example if they usually only play with \$100 per day
  then this would be even more suspicious.
- Participants noted that this would likely cause an SMR to be raised based on the UAR submitted.
- It was noted that this is a common scenario; this is heavily enforced and everyone would understand what is happening in this
  scenario.
- . It was noted that there is no difference in the amount of UARs submitted for this situation since pre-Bergin.
- · Participants noted that the area manager is likely to raise the UAR at some point during their shift.

#### Scenario 7

A cashier (1) is working in a Cage on the main floor. He notices a male customer approach one of the other cashiers (2) and tenders what appears to be \$4,000 to \$5,000 in \$10, \$20 and \$50 denominations. The customer approaching Cashier 2 is notable because there are already two customers waiting to be served while there are other cashiers who are free. It appears that the customer deposits this cash to a DAB Account.

Cashier 1 has seen this customer appear at Crown on several occasions over the previous six months and each time he walks out of the gaming floor having deposited funds to a DAB account without going to a gaming table, eTG or EGM.

On this occasion, the customer is wearing a corporate shirt marked "The Refuge Café" and the name "Simon". Cashier 1 speaks to Cashier 2 and asks whether he is going to complete a UAR. Cashier 2 responds "Why should I?" Cashier 1 submits a UAR in the AML Portal.

- Focus group participants noted that the cashier would go to their manager in this situation.
- It was noted that multiple things are happening in this scenario, such as possible collusion between the cashier and customer, and
  the relevance or red flags are due to the low denomination notes.
- If a UAR is submitted this is a trigger for further action, it was noted that Sentinel rules may also be flagged through this activity.
- It was noted that Poker does not provide individuals with rated play, as it is not against the casino.
- The group also noted that people who live in the area use Crown as a bank; they are open 24/7, provide good FX exchange rates and other advantages.

The CCTV surveillance team is monitoring activity in the Roulette area of the Mahogany Room. One of the surveillance operators observes a customer arriving at a roulette table is carrying a large quantity of cash that appear to be in a mix of \$50 and \$20 denominations.

The customer removes a bundle of notes without counting them (retaining the remainder of the bundle of notes) and hands them to the croupier who exchanges the cash for around \$6,000 in chips.

The customer plays the next two games at the table before getting up and moving on to another roulette table where the same pattern occurs.

The surveillance operators forms the view that this behaviour may be indicative of 'structuring' and prepares a UAR in the AML portal.

- The focus group indicated that this scenario is a common example that staff are given in training, however it is not necessarily a common scenario in practice.
- The AML team noted they have always received UARs relating to structuring activity, but not necessarily this example.
- Structuring and no rated play (buying in and not playing) are the most common types of UARs that the AML team receive.
- It was noted that it would be unusual for a staff member to submit a UAR on losses because they might not be aware of a particular customer's losses.

## Scenario 9

A cashier is operating in a Cage in the Teak Room. At 4.00 pm she is approached by a customer who exchanges \$2,000 cash for chips of various denominations and offers his Crown Rewards Card to record the transaction. She watches as the customer heads for the gaming tables.

At 7.30 pm, the same customer returns to the same cashier and tenders \$7,800 in chips and instructs the cashier to raise a cheque for his "winnings". He makes vague comments throughout the transaction about being "lucky tonight!"

The cashier believes that the customer's emphasis on 'winnings' is suspicious and she submits a UAR in the AML Portal. Would the situation be different if the customer returned at 5.00 wanting to cashout?

- The focus group noted that over 3-4 hours this would not be suspicious or rare, but it all depends on whether the user has rated play or verifiable play.
- If the patron had not used their card, the cashier would tell the area manager who would also contact the table games manager to
  make enquiries about the patron, where they played and potentially contact surveillance.
- It was noted that patrons sometimes do not use their member card whilst playing for superstitious reasons or responsible gaming avoidance.
- This scenario depends heavily on how long the patron was there for, whether the play was rated or tracked and whether other staff
  or surveillance can verify play taking place.